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Article 4

CHAIN REACTION: HOW PROPERTY
BEGETS PROPERTY
Sabrina Safrin*
INTRODUCTION

In 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its seminal decision, Diamond v. Chakrabarty.1 That decision permitted the patenting, and
hence the private ownership, of man-made living organisms. 2 What
the reams of paper filed in this watershed case did not anticipate was
how the patenting of genetically modified organisms would cause
nations and individuals responsively to assert property rights over naturally occurring biological and genetic material. The propertization
of living organisms and their genetic material did not remain cabined
to "man's handiwork." Rather, it set off an unexpected chain reaction
of collateral propertization of unmodified genetic and other biological material.
Until recently, nations and individuals treated genetic materialthe subcellular sequences that direct the structure and characteristics
of all living things-as open access property.3 Like information in the
© 2007 Sabrina Safrin. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, Law
School, Newark. J.D., University of California, Berkeley; B.A., Pomona College. This
Article received support from the Dean's scholarship fund. Many thanks to Bernard
Bell, Neil Buchanan, Norman Cantor, Sherry Colb, Jeffrey Dunoff, Ellen Goodman,
Paul Heald, Jeremy Hirsh, Howard Latin, Eduardo Penalver, Kal Raustiala, George
Thomas III, Mark Weiner, Phil Weiser and to participants at the 2006 Intellectual
Property Scholars Conference and at workshops at Arizona State University College of
Law and at Rutgers Law School, Newark for their assistance with earlier drafts. I
thank Randall Berman and Elizabeth Kunkel for their excellent research assistance
and extend special appreciation to Greg Mark and to Dr. Wolf and Sari Safrin.
1 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
2 Id. at 318.
3 SeeJohn R. Adair, The Bioprospecting Question: Should the United States Charge Biotechnology Companiesfor the Commercial Use of Public Wild Genetic Resources?, 24 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 131, 141 (1997) (noting that access to all wild genetic resources had traditionally
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public domain, genetic resources were available in principle for the
use of all. 4 No one held an exclusive ownership interest in this material, and individuals and countries freely shared samples of seeds, soil
and even animal specimens containing it. 5 In sharp contrast, today,
extensive ownership rights envelop genetic material. 6 Individuals and
corporations patent genetic sequences that they have isolated. 7 Meanwhile, national governments of developing countries, which house
most of the world's genetic material in its natural state, increasingly
assert sovereign ownership rights over biological samples containing
this material.8
What accounts for this transformation? Explaining the evolution
of property rights from open access or global commons regimes to
more exclusive ones has long presented one of the great challenges to
understanding developments in the law. 9 This long-standing query
holds particular importance today. Nations and societies preserve
fewer places, spaces and goods as open access or commons property,
been open); Edgar J. Asebey & Jill D. Kempenaar, Biodiversity Prospecting:Fulfilling the
Mandate of the Biodiversity Convention, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 703, 707 (1995) (stating that genetic resources were traditionally viewed as part of a "common heritage ...
freely available to all"); Cary Fowler, ProtectingFarmer Innovation: The Convention on
BiologicalDiversity and the Question of Origin, 41 JURIMETRIGSJ. 477, 480-81 (2001) (noting the "long-established system of easy access to biological resources); Kal Raustiala
& David G. Victor, The Regime Complexfor Plant Genetic Resources, 58 INT'L ORG. 277, 284
(2004) ("For most of human history, the rule of common heritage governed [plant
genetic resources]."). Briefly, the cells of all living things contain genes. Genes code
for proteins, and proteins determine the structure and characteristics of life forms.
MATr RIDLEY, GENOME

6-9 (1999).

4 Sabrina Safrin, Hyperownership in a Time of BiotechnologicalPromise: The International Conflict to Control the Building Blocks of Life, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 641, 644 (2004).
5 See id. at 641, 644-45.
6 Id. at 645-46.
7 While a gene or a genetic sequence in its natural state cannot be patented, a
patent may issue if the naturally occurring gene is synthesized from its original state
and ascribed a useful function. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092,
1093 (Jan. 5, 2001); LindaJ. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double
Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 303, 359-60 (2002). For example, no patent may issue for a gene in a person
that bears responsibility for breast cancer while the gene remains in the person. A
patent, however, may issue if someone isolates the gene and identifies a useful function for it. The isolated and purified genetic sequence does not exist in nature.
8 Safrin, supra note 4, at 641.
9 See Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331, S331 (2002); see also Hanoch Dagan & Michael A.
Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE LJ. 549, 561 (2001) (stating that the evolution
from commons to private property "remains a puzzle").
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replacing them instead with more exclusive property regimes.' 0 Over
the last several decades, knowledge, in particular, has undergone
increased propertization, and the trend to expand intellectual property rights continues."
The canonical explanation offered by Harold Demsetz for the
evolution of property regimes1 2 is that private property rights emerge
when the economic value of a resource changes relative to the costs of
controlling it such that it becomes cost-efficient to establish a property
regime over the resource and to internalize costs or benefits previ-

10

On the general expansion of private property at the expense of open access or

commons systems, see DAVID BOLLIER, PUBLIC ASSETS, PRIVATE PROFITS 27-31 (2001).
11 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 3-16 (2001); see also Michael A.
Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 12
(2004) (describing how the duration and scope of intellectual property rights have
been expanding without limit); Edmund W. Kitch, Intellectual Property and the Common
Law, 78 VA. L. REv. 293, 293 (1992) (noting wide agreement that intellectual property
protection has expanded in recent years). Legal protection has increased in two
important ways: The domain of the protected interest has expanded, and the nature
of the protection accorded has expanded. See WendyJ. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 151-57
(1992); see also Carrier, supra, at 8-12 (noting the "dramatically enlarged scope and
duration" of intellectual property). Patents now extend to innovations that a previous
generation considered unpatentable. These include software, living organisms and
business methods. The standards for obtaining a patent have relaxed. See ADAM B.
JAFFE &JosH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 10-11 (2004). Patent examiners used to operate under the edict that when in doubt they should reject. Id. at
34-35. Today the operating assumption is when in doubt, grant. Id. Property rights
in the area of copyright have expanded dramatically in duration, scope and in the
categories of work eligible for protection. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193-94
(2003) (upholding Congress's expansion of the copyright term by twenty years); Carrier, supra, at 13-16; Gordon, supra, at 152-54. For the expansion of property rights
in the area of trademark, see Boston Prof'I Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem
Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying the antidilution doctrine so as to
threaten to grant perpetual protection for symbols even when their use causes no
confusion as to the source of origin); Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basisfor Trademark Protection, 58 U. Prrr. L. REv. 789, 851-63
(1997); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE L.J. 1687, 1687-88 (1999); David Dante Troutt, A Portrait of the Trademark as a
Black Man: IntellectualProperty, Commodification, and Redescription, 38 U.C. DAvis L. REV.
1141, 1144-46 (2005).

12

Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of PropertyRights, 57 AM.

ECON. REV. PAPERS &
Merrill notes that most efforts to explain the transformation of
property rights from open access or commons systems to more exclusive ownership
regimes begin with Demsetz's work. See Merrill, supra note 9, at S331. Indeed, many,
if not most, first year property law courses begin with Demsetz's celebrated work. See,
e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 41-50 (6th ed. 2006).
PROC. 347 (1967).
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ously experienced as externalities.' 3 Changes in relative value typically occur when some external shock, like the introduction of a new
technology or the opening or closing of particular markets, alters the
costs and benefits of the existing property regime. 14 Biotechnology
explains the transition of genetic material from open access property
5
to private or government property from a Demsetzian perspective.'
The introduction of this novel technology, which enables the manipulation of genes to create new agricultural, therapeutic and other
goods, increased the actual or the potential value of the underlying
genetic material used by the technology.' 6 This increased value
7
engendered the creation of property rights over genetic material.1
Yet, one cannot explain the overall evolution of property rights
over genetic material from an open access or global commons good to
a private or government-owned good by pointing to an increase in its
economic value relative to the costs of controlling it. Actual or potential value does not explain today's extensive property regimes over
genetic material. Indeed, the extent of these rights and the costs of
establishing and maintaining them often exceed the material's economic value.1 8 As we shall see, the Demsetzian account does not adequately explain the rise of property rights in other areas either.
Under the classic Demsetzian account, the emergence of private
property rights marks a progressive development that should be celebrated because it reflects a society's movement to a more efficient
property regime.' 9 Others have proposed a more sinister interest
13 Demsetz, supra note 12, at 350. Demsetz identified three types of externalities
internalized by private property rights. First, the creation of private property rights
creates incentives for people to improve the resource in question. Id. at 356. Otherwise, the community as a whole would benefit from the individual's work, creating a
free rider problem. Second, in the case of a scarce resource, private property rights
can mitigate its depletion, and hence prevent a tragedy of the commons. Id. Third,
the creation of private property rights can reduce the number of parties who must
agree to control spillover effects, such as flooding and pollution. Id. at 356-57. Property rights can thereby facilitate a consensus to address these problems. Merrill, supra
note 9, at S331-32.
14 Stuart Banner, TransitionsBetween Property Regimes, 31J. LEGAL STUD. S359, S359
(2002); Demsetz, supra note 12, at 350.
15 Raustiala & Victor, supra note 3, at 279, 282-83.
16

Id.

17 See id. (applying Demsetz's thesis to the evolution of property rights over plant
genetic material).
18 See infra Part III.C.
19 Banner, supra note 14, at S360. Scholars have criticized Demsetz's thesis on a
number of grounds. Richard A. Posner faults Demsetz for making an unjustified
"leap from assuming efficiency maximizing behavior of individuals to assuming efficiency-maximizing behavior of a society." DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 49
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1

This Article sug-

gests that instead of the progressive dynamic envisioned by the classic
Demsetzian account, a more subtle and damaging chain reaction
dynamic can come into play that interest group theory neither anticipates nor explains. 21 This Article argues that the establishment and
the expansion of intellectual and other property rights have an internally generative dynamic. The assertion of or demand for property
rights by some engenders the assertion of or demand for related property rights by others. This cycle of increased demand for and resulting
recognition of property rights may have little to do with the actual or
the potential value of the resource in question relative to the costs of
controlling it. Rather, the creation of property rights itself engenders
the demand for additional property rights.
Part I develops this chain reaction theory for the evolution of
property by drawing upon several case studies: (a) the newly established property regimes over genetic material; (b) the recent move(quoting Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L.
REv. 281, 289 (1979)). Carol Rose and Barry Fried note that while Demsetz criticizes
common property, he gives short shrift to its virtues. Id. at 50. Finally, others fault
Demsetz for attempting to derive conclusions on property ownership and use "from
incomplete historical data on primitive societies." Id. at 50 (quoting Eric T. Freyfogle,
Land Use and the Study of Early American History, 94 YALE L.J. 717, 740 n.73 (1985)).
Despite these criticisms, Demsetz's thesis remains the most common starting point for
understanding why property rights evolve. See supra note 12.
20 Saul Levmore points out that for every optimistic efficiency-based story about
the evolution of property rights there exists a pessimistic interest-group-based story.
Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S421,
S431 (2002). For example, Terry Anderson and Peter Hill posit that property rights
emerge because individuals of superior ability act to capture the economic rents from
the creation of property rights. Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Cowboys and Contracts, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S489, S490-93 (2002). According to Stuart Banner, when
powerful oligarchs control both the political system and the largest share of resources
whose value would be maximized by the creation of property, property rights will
arise. Banner, supra note 14, at S365-70. Interest group theories, for example,
appear to best explain Congress's recent extension of the copyright term by twenty
years. Congress seems to have largely bowed to the demands of the Disney Corporation and other politically powerful corporations who stood to gain from the extension. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 408-09 (2003) (describing the forces that
called for and even drafted the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-304 (2000)).
21 Interest group theories do not explain, for example, the emergence of property rights over naturally occurring genetic material or sui generis intellectual property rights over traditional knowledge, discussed infra Part I.A-B. Those proposing
and promulgating these rights, most notably developing country governments, do not
constitute interest groups.
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ment to establish intellectual property rights over traditional
knowledge; and (c) the dramatic increase in patent activity even
though paradoxically the expected value of individual patents has
22
diminished, commonly referred to as the patent paradox.
Part II offers three explanations for why property rights evolve in
a chain reaction. The first two draw upon group behavior theory and
focus on social dynamics rather than on the kind of economic factors
that Demsetz and his followers have emphasized. The third flows
from property's core right-the right to exclude.
The chain reaction theory for the evolution of property rights
yields several important insights which are developed in Part III. First,
the creation of property rights in one sphere can trigger unanticipated changes in other property regimes, a phenomenon that traditional theories do not usually anticipate nor adequately explain. 23 In
fact, those demanding or creating the initial property rights may even
be aghast at the repercussions of their actions. Today's global economy makes this collateral creation of property rights more pronounced because changes in property rights in one country can
trigger unanticipated changes in the property regimes of another.
Second, the thesis gives new importance to first movers in the evolution of property rights precisely because first movers may initiate a
chain reaction of propertization. Third, while a change in actual or
potential value occasioned by a technological or market breakthrough
may provide the impetus for moving toward a property regime, the
transition process itself may have little to do with value or any costbenefit calculation. As a result, the overall resulting property regime
may not reflect an efficient outcome from a cost-benefit perspective
and may be worse than the regime that preceded it.
The chain reaction theory for the evolution of property rights has
both explanatory power and cautionary implication. It helps explain
the emergence of more restrictive property regimes and the expansion of existing ones. 24 It does not, however, purport to explain the
22

Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1,

5, 17 (2005) (summarizing the patent paradox).
23 Some have drawn attention to a "domino" effect that the commoditization of
certain goods can have. They argue that once market value enters the rhetoric for
that good, this rhetoric can contaminate all thinking about it. See generally Margaret
Jane Radin, Market-Inalienablily, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1849, 1912-14 (1987) (describing
the domino theory). The domino effect differs from the chain reaction dynamic discussed in this Article. The chain reaction dynamic envisions property rights in one
sphere engendering the creation of property rights in a different though related
sphere, and is not rhetoric-based.
24 Property theorists distinguish between different forms of property regimes that
represent a spectrum of access accorded to a given resource. These include: open
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transformation of property regimes in all situations or to serve as the
exclusive explanation for the process through which all property
rights evolve. Other theories, like the powerful interest group theories, 25 theories that focus on the evolution of property norms in closeknit communities, 26 or those that point to other factors for property
27
rights such as the nexus between property and human flourishing,
may better explain the transformation of property in some situations
or may operate in conjunction with the chain reaction theory in
others. The chain reaction theory is cautionary because it shows that
once property rights are created, they take on a life of their own and
can have serious unanticipated consequences. Therefore, deciaccess regimes, commons property regimes, state-ownership regimes and private
property regimes. See, e.g., Dagan & Heller, supra note 9, at 555-58 (discussing the
three standard forms of ownership-commons property, private property, and state
property). Open access regimes allow the greatest amount of access. Id. at 557.
Open access resources remain available to all. Id. Commons property remains available to all members of a given group. Id. If that group is sufficiently large, the difference between open access and commons resources is slight. Id. In state ownership
regimes, the state owns the resource in question and can provide extensive or little
access to the good in question. Private property belongs to a given individual or legal
person who can generally restrict access. Id. at 556. Recently, scholars have identified
mixed regimes which blend aspects of both commons and private property. See Robert A. Heverly, The Information Semicommons, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1127, 1161-64
(2003); Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29
J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 131-34 (2000). This Article tackles the transition from more
open systems of property to more restrictive ones. While this usually involves the
evolution of an open access or general commons resource to a private property good,
it can also involve the movement from an open access good to a more restricted one,
such as to a state-owned or limited commons good.
25 See supra note 20.
26 Some suggest that property rights "emerge as a norm widely shared among the
members of a close-knit community with a strong commonality of interests." Merrill,
supra note 9, at S336-37 (identifying the norm theory and the interest group theories
as the two main theoretical clusters for explaining the transformation of property
rights). Richard Epstein, for example, points to the emergence of informal exclusion
rights to on-street parking following snowstorms as a situation where a property norm
emerges in a neighborhood community. Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parkingon Public Roads, 31J. LEGAL STUD. S515, S528-33 (2002). Robert Ellickson posits that efficient norms emerge in close-knit communities of well-informed and
similarly endowed people. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 167 (1991);
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1320-21. But see Eric A.
Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. RE-,. 1697, 1706, 1724-25
(1995) (criticizing the view that closely knit communities produce efficient norms).
27 MargaretJane Radin, Property and Personhood,34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982)
(arguing "that to achieve proper self-development.., an individual needs some control over resources in the external environment" and those "necessary assurances of
control take the form of property rights").
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sionmakers, when granting new property rights or expanding existing
ones, need to take into account the reverberation effect of their
28
actions up front.

In most scholarship on tangible and intangible property, to the
extent that the fields are considered together, the tendency is to borrow insights from conventional property rights and apply these
insights to intellectual property. 29 The scholarship also focuses on the
evolution of property in national contexts. This Article, in contrast,
uses case studies from intellectual property to yield insights into the
evolution of property generally, upending our usual way of thinking. 30
Moreover, it draws upon international developments to shed light on
a long-standing question in property law that has remained insufficiently illuminated in national contexts. In doing so, it may represent
the next frontier in the study of international law, namely the use of
28 The issue of how much property constitutes too much falls outside the scope of
this Article.
29 See, e.g.,
Carrier, supra note 11, at 5 (arguing that legal limitations on tangible
property should apply to intellectual property); WendyJ. Gordon, A PropertyRight in
Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102
YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) (applying Lockean tenants of property to intellectual property);
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of IntellectualProperty, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988) (applying a
range of property theories, including Margaret Jane Radin's property as personhood
theory, to intellectual property). But see Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, REv. L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at
14-24), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=855244 (using copyright law to challenge Demsetz's normative thesis by arguing that externalities do not necessarily distort the allocation of resources and that for certain classes of intellectual property
works less internalization may lead to more investment).
30 The evolution of property rights over both tangible goods and over knowledge
involves the same core issue of why and how people seek to establish ownership rights
over goods. Stephen R. Munzer, The Commons and the Anticommons in the Law and
Theory of Property, in THE BLAcKwELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 148, 149 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005). Moreover, the use of case studies from the intellectual property field appears particularly
appropriate given that intellectual property rights themselves have sufficiently
expanded over the last two decades increasingly to resemble property rights over tangible goods. See Carrier, supra note 11, at 4-5; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'v 108, 112 (1990) (asserting, inter
alia, that the "right to exclude in intellectual property is no different in principle
from the right to exclude in physical property"); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2005) (noting that the legal
regime for intellectual property "increasingly looks like the law of real property").
Furthermore, as demonstrated by the case study below involving genetic material, the
line between tangible and intangible goods can blur. See infra Part I.A. An expansion
of intellectual property rights over intangible goods like biotechnological innovations
can trigger the expansion of property rights over tangible or quasi-tangible goods like
raw genetic material.
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international developments to help answer outstanding questions of
31
general legal concern.
I.

THREE CASE STUDIES OF THE CHAIN REACTION EVOLUTION OF

PROPERTY RIGHTS

In a nuclear chain reaction, the splitting of the nucleus of one
atom releases neutrons which in turn split the nuclei of additional
atoms and so on. 32 In a propertization chain reaction, the creation or
the expansion of property rights causes individuals to seek additional
property rights. Just as the first generation splitting of a nucleus produces second generation nucleic splits, the creation of first generation
property rights engenders the creation of second generation property
rights. These second generation property rights often arise in spheres
related to, but other than, the sphere in which the original property
rights arose and are generally unexpected by decisionmakers who created the first generation rights. While the creation of first generation
property rights largely finds explanation and justification in traditional theories of tangible and intangible property rights, the second
generation property rights that they engender do not. Unlike first
generation private property rights, which may reduce tragedies of the
commons, address resource scarcity, maximize efficiency, encourage
investment in the development of the resource and, in the intellectual
property context, promote innovation and creative works, second generation property rights do not accomplish these goals. This section
will explore three case studies to illustrate how the chain reaction process works. The case studies show that, whatever the motivation for
the creation or the expansion of some initial property rights, once
these rights are created, another dynamic can kick in.
31 Scholars of comparative law and international law often consider the laws of
other countries or international standards to ascertain best legal practices or emerging norms. The approach utilized in this Article, in contrast, does not focus on a
particular doctrinal question, such as whether the patent system ought to reward the
first to file a patent application rather than the first to invent or whether the death
penalty comports with the norms of nations comparable to the United States. Rather,
it uses international developments to tackle broader legal puzzles. It thus adds a new
realm to those suggested by other international law scholars for the innovative use of
international law. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993) (suggesting an
interdisciplinary approach whereby international relations theorists learn from international law and international lawyers learn from international relations theory);Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of InternationalLaw, 24 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1, 5 (1999) (applying economic theory to international law but also suggesting that international law can inform our understanding of law and economics).
32 See AM. NUCLEAR SOC'Y, CONTROLLED NUCLEAR CHAIN REACTION 8 (1992).
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The Evolution of Property Rights Over Genetic Material

Before Chakrabarty, with the notable exception of certain manmade plants that received a limited form of intellectual property protection in a few countries, types of living organisms, whether naturally
occurring or man-made through traditional breeding, could not be
exclusively owned. 33 For example, while a person might own a particular dog, no one could own a breed of dog. Moreover, nations
treated genetic material as an open access resource. 34 As with the living resources of the high seas, states did not assert sovereignty over
35
genetic material nor did they seek to appropriate it.
No single individual, corporation or nation held an exclusive right to prevent others
36
from using the resource generally.
The Chakrabarty case generated numerous amicus briefs.3 7 All
knew that if the Supreme Court allowed Dr. Chakrabarty to patent his
genetically engineered oil-eating microbe, others would seek to patent
and hence enjoy property rights over their man-made living creations.
Indeed, in the ten years following Chakrabarty's victory, patents were
extended in rapid order to isolated and purified genetic sequences, 3 8
33 See Raustiala & Victor, supra note 3, at 284.
34 See supra note 3.
35 Safrin, supra note 4, at 644-45 & nn.15-22.
36 Id. at 645 & n.22.
37 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980) (noting the large number
of amicus briefs); see also infra notes 188-90, 192 (collecting amicus briefs in
Chakrabarty).
38 SeeAmgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1205-12 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(upholding a 1987 patent on a purified and isolated human DNA sequence encoding
erythropoietin); U.S. Patent No. 4,370,417 (filed Apr. 3, 1980) (issued Jan. 25, 1983)
(covering the DNA sequence for plaminogen activator protein). The Chakrabarty
decision swung open the door to the patenting of "anything under the sun that is
made by man." Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5
(1952)). In so doing, it created an environment favorable to the patenting of genetic
sequences provided that they could be deemed man's handiwork. Earlier cases that
allowed the patenting of isolated and purified chemical compounds provided the
basis for a man's handiwork determination. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189
F. 95, 97, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), afj'd in part, rev'd in part, 196 F. 496, 500 (2d Cir.
1912), upheld a patent on adrenaline, a substance isolated and purified from the
adrenal glands of animals. Judge Learned Hand reasoned that no one had ever isolated a similar substance, and the patentee "was the first to make [the extract] available for any use by removing it from the other gland-tissue ... [whereby] it became for
every practical purpose a new thing commercially and therapeutically." Id. at 103; see
also Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 164 (4th Cir. 1958)
(upholding a patent on purified Vitamin B-12). In Amgen, the Federal Circuit noted
that "[a] gene is a chemical compound, albeit a complex one." Amgen, 927 F.2d at
1206. The lower court in Amgen explained, "The invention claimed ... is not as
plaintiff argues the DNA sequence encoding human EPO since that is a nonpatent-
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to man-made plants, 39 and to animals. 40 Unanticipated, however, was
how the propertization of living organisms and their genetic material
would set off a chain reaction of collateral propertization of unmodified genetic and other naturally-occurring biological material. First,
the governments of developing countries began to assert sovereign
ownership rights over raw genetic material in their countries and to
restrict access to such material. 4' Second, patients began to assert
property or other legal rights in biological specimens, such as blood
or tissue samples, that they had contributed in the course of receiving
medical treatment. 42 By the turn of the millennium, raw biological
material increasingly moved from an open access or global commons
good to a private or government-owned good.
Demsetz's thesis as well as traditional theories for the granting of
intellectual property rights explain the actions of those who sought
patents over bioengineered goods and isolated genetic sequences as
well as developed countries' grant to them of these first generation
property rights. The biotechnology revolution offered economic
reward to those who could isolate genetic sequences and create
bioengineered innovations. Chakrabarty and those that supported
him sought to establish a property interest in their living innovations
to capture the economic value of their contributions. The United
States and most other developed countries extended patent protection to these inventions to promote their emerging biotechnology
sectors.
Demsetz's thesis as well as traditional theories for intellectual or
tangible property rights do not adequately explain nor even usually
anticipate the second wave of propertization: the emergence of exclusive ownership rights over raw biological material. Granting property
able natural phenomenon 'free to all men and reserved exclusively to none ...

'
Rather, the invention as claimed.., is the 'purified and isolated DNA sequence encoding erythropoietin." Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737,
1759 (D. Mass. 1989) (emphasis added) (quoting Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 309), affd
in part, vacated in part, 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). For a critique of gene patenting, see Eileen M. Kane, Splitting the Gene: DNA Patentsand the Genetic Code, 71 TENN. L.
REv. 707, 764-67 (2004).
39 Ex parte Hibbard, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 444 (B.P.A.I. 1985) (allowing patent for genetically engineered maize seed).
40 See, e.g., ExparteAllen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1426 (B.P.A.I. 1987) (permitting patent of a genetically modified oyster egg), affd, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22, 1984) (issued Apr. 12, 1988) (covering a
mouse genetically engineered for susceptibility to cancer, commonly known as the
"Onco-Mouse").
41 See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 62-80 and accompanying text.
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rights in naturally occurring genetic material does not encourage
innovation. This material already exists. Moreover, property rights in
raw genetic material do not, for example, avoid tragedies of the commons or address resource scarcity. Genetic material is not at risk of

overuse, and one need not fell a forest to access its genetic material.
While a desire to profit from biological samples may play some role in
demands both by developing countries and by patients for a property
interest in their raw biological samples, it leaves much unexplained.
Instead, as shown below, these second generation property rights
arose in response to the first generation property rights. 43 A tit-for-tat
dynamic, rather than a cost-benefit analysis designed to capture the
actual or potential economic value of raw genetic material, animates
the emergence of these responsive property rights.
Developing countries harbor the greatest amount of the world's
naturally occurring genetic material because they comprise most of
the countries which hug the equatorial line where the greatest numbers of life forms concentrate. 4 4 Why, these countries asked, should
individuals and companies from gene-poor developed countries
obtain genetic material free of charge from gene-rich developing
countries when they then patent these genes and at times sell them
back to the country where the genetic material originated? 45 Moreover, developing countries faced increasing pressure to extend patent
protection to man-made living organisms and their genetic material.
In the late 1980s, the United States began to require, as a condition of
free trade relations, that other countries extend intellectual property
43 See infta Part I.B-C.
44 Envtl. Policy Studies Workshop, Access to Genetic Resources: An Evaluation of the
Development and Implementation of Recent Regulation and Access Agreements 3 (Columbia
Univ. Sch. Int'l & Pub. Affairs, Working Paper No. 4, 1999), available at http://www.
biodiv.org/doc/case-studies/abs/cs-abs-agr-rpt.pdf.
45 WALTER REiD ET AL., BIODvEPRsrry PROSPECTING 23 (1993). See generally Keith
Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-So-Brave) New World
Order of InternationalIntellectual Property Protection, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11,
47-50 (1998) (summarizing the objections of Vandana Shiva, Ruth Gana (Okediji),
Rosemary Coombe, James Boyle, Jack Kloppenberg and others who have written
about the "Great Seed Rip-off," whereby international conventions allowed plant
breeders to use traditional indigenous varieties of seeds and "improve them" via
minor genetic alterations without compensating the countries from where those seeds
originated); James 0. Odek, Bio-Piracy: Creating Proprietary Rights in Plant Genetic
Resources, 2J. INTELL. PROP. L. 141, 141 (1994) (explaining that developing countries
now "passionately" protest the prospecting for plant species by scientists from multinational corporations in developing countries' tropical forests who then protect
their discoveries through intellectual property rights). "To developing countries,
these practices constitute uncompensated exploitation of their 'plant genetic
resources' in the name of intellectual property rights." Id. at 141.
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protection to bioengineered and other goods. 46 This link between
trade and intellectual property rights blossomed in full with the 1994
adoption of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPS Agreement") as part of the world trading system. 47 The TRIPS Agreement required countries to extend intellectual property protection to most bioengineered goods or face trade
sanctions.

48

In response to the propertization of improved genetic material,
developing countries pressed for the international recognition of sovereign rights over raw genetic material in the 1992 Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD).49 The CBD no longer considered genetic
resources to form part of "the common heritage of mankind," as had
traditionally been the case, but rather to fall within the province of
46 SusAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS 132-39 (1998) (discussing U.S. linkage of
trade and intellectual property in bilateral negotiations); Laurence R. Heifer, Regime
Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of InternationalIntellectualProperty Lawmaking, 29 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1, 20-22 (2004) (discussing how the United States successfully achieved more stringent intellectual property protection standards in developing
countries in the 1980s by linking intellectual property protection to trade and helped
motivate the United States to shift intellectual property lawmaking from the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT)); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and InternationalRelations Theory: An
Analysis of the World Trade Organization,44 DuKE L.J. 829, 843-44 (1995) (describing
statutes which give the U.S. President unilateral authority to impose trade sanctions
on those countries which did not protect intellectual property by using section 301,
"Super 301" and "Special 301," all of which were part of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, as amended in 1988).
47 WoRLD TRADE ORG., THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 321 (1999) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
48 Id. art. 27, at 332-33. Article 27(3) (b) allows WTO members to exclude animals from patentability. Id. at 333. The United States, however, has pressed countries to extend such protection through post-TRIPS bilateral agreements, commonly
referred to as TRIPS-plus agreements. GENETIC RES. ACTION INT'L (GRAIN), "TRIPSPLUS" THROUGH THE BACK DOOR 4-5 (2001), http://www.grain.org/docs/trips-plusen.pdf (identifying some 23 bilateral and regional agreements requiring intellectual
property protection for life forms beyond that mandated by the TRIPS Agreement,
including agreements with Jordan, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka and Vietnam). See
generally Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 791, 792-807 (2001) (describing "TRIPS-plus" bilateral agreements
between developing countries and the United States and the European Community).
49 Article 15(1) of the Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 143, 152 [hereinafter CBD] states: "Recognizing the sovereign rights of
States over their natural resources, the authority to determine access to genetic
resources rests with the national governments and is subject to national legislation."
As ofJanuary 2007, 190 states have ratified or acceded to the convention. The United
States has signed but not joined the Convention. Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, http://www.biodiv.org/world/parties.asp (last visited May 16, 2007).
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sovereigns who would control access to such material. 50 Since 1993,
over forty nations have passed or are in the process of passing laws
which greatly restrict access to raw genetic material in their countries. 51 Under these laws, the national government either owns all raw
genetic material in the country or greatly restricts access to it through
52
a multilayered consent process.

One can further see the reactive dynamic at play in the history of
the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food
and Agriculture ("International Undertaking"). In the 1920s and
1930s, a select number of developed countries began to grant plant
breeders a limited form of intellectual property rights (commonly
referred to as plant breeders' rights) for their new and stable plant
varieties. 5 3 In 1961, they adopted a treaty to provide for these breeders' rights. 54 This marked a change from the traditional system where
farmers and breeders freely shared their improved varieties with one
another. 55 Developing countries responded to these new property
rights by pressing for an international agreement that would guarantee that all breeding lines, whether traditional or improved, would
remain open. 56 Eight developed countries refused to join this agreement out of concern that it would interfere with plant breeders' intel-

50 Cynthia M. Ho, Biopiracy and Beyond: A Consideration of Socio-Cultural Conflicts
with Global PatentPolicies, 39 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 433, 473 (2006); Safrin, supra note
4, at 644-45, 647.
51 Lyle Glowka, Bioprospecting, Alien Invasive Species, and Hydrothermal Vents: Three
Emerging Legal Issues in the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, 13 TUL.
ENVTL. LJ. 329, 330-31 (2000) (reporting that fifteen nations or state provinces have
passed laws greatly restricting access to raw biological, including genetic, material
within their borders). Since Mr. Glowka's article, at least two other nations, Brazil
and India, have put access-restricting regimes into place. See Safrin, supra note 4, at
641 n.4. At least thirty others are in the process of doing so as of 2000. See Glowka,
supra, at 331 & n.9.
52 For an analysis of these laws, see Safrin, supra note 4, at 649-55.
53 See Fowler, supra note 3, at 477-78.
54 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2,
1961, 33 U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 89 (as amended in 1978 & 1991) [hereinafter
UPOV Convention], available at http://www.upov.int/en/publications/conventions/
1991/pdf/actI99l.pdf. Member States to this Convention must grant and protect
breeders' rights at the national level for plant varieties that are new, distinct, uniform
and stable. Id. art. 6(1).
55 Fowler, supra note 3, at 479-80; Raustiala & Victor, supra note 3, at 284-87.
56 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific
and Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 919,
928 (1996).
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In 1989, these countries succeeded in

adding an Annex to the International Undertaking, which expressly
stated that the Undertaking would not compromise breeders' rights. 58

Having failed to maintain an open system, developing countries
responded by asserting their sovereign rights over plant genetic material in a second Annex, which parties to the Undertaking adopted in
1991.59

While a desire to profit from genetic material partly underlies the
development of sovereign rights over genetic material, 60 conspicuously absent from the years of international and national deliberations
on arrangements to restrict access to genetic material are basic threshold determinations key to a cost-benefit analysis. One does not see,
for example, calculations of the demand for raw genetic material as
reflected in actual levels of bioprospecting activity. Decisionmakers
and negotiators also appear uninterested in determining the actual
supply of genetic material reflected, for example, in the extent to
which raw genetic material is scarce or widespread. Missing too are
estimated costs of establishing and enforcing government ownership
regimes. Why?
The key operating dynamic is that of a tit-for-tat. Namely, if
developed countries assert and demand that developifig countries recognize intellectual property rights over man-made living organisms
and isolated and purified genetic sequences, then developing countries believe that they should also assert property interests over the raw
genetic material that may contribute to the patented goods. Raw
genetic material has contributed to pharmaceutical innovations and
improved crops from time immemorial. Yet sovereigns only asserted
ownership rights over this material after the patent system recognized
private ownership rights over the material and internationalized these
property rights through pre-TRIPS agreements and eventually
57 International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, FAQ Conference Res.
4/89, at 8, 25th Sess. (Nov. 29, 1989) [hereinafter FAO Res. 4/89], availableat ftp://
ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/Res/C4-89E.pdf.
58 Id. at 8-9.
59 International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, FAO Conference Res.
3/91, at 12, 26th Sess. (Nov. 25, 1991) [hereinafter FAO Res. 3/91], available atftp://
ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/Res/C3-91E.pdf (providing that the International Undertaking's heritage of mankind concept was "subject to the sovereignty of the states over
their plant genetic resources" and that "nations have sovereign rights over their plant
genetic resources").
60 Those encouraging developing countries to pass legislation restricting access
to raw genetic material frequently characterized genetic material as "genetic oil" or
.genetic gold." However, they made no serious attempt to back these assertions with
facts.
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through the TRIPS Agreement itself. Public statements of developing
country leaders also evidence this responsive dynamic. 6 '
Similarly, a cost-benefit analysis designed to capture the actual or
the potential economic value of raw genetic material does not animate patient demands for a property interest or related legal right
over contributed tissue samples. Again, a reactive dynamic plays out.
Donors felt that if researchers and corporations obtain property rights
by patenting cell lines and genetic sequences isolated from tissue samples, then they too should claim a property interest in the tissue samples from which those patents sprung.
Moore v. Regents of the University of California6 2 represents the most
celebrated case involving this kind of a property claim. University of
California medical researchers freely obtained blood and tissue samples from patient John Moore in the course of treating him for hairycell leukemia. 63 Indeed, for generations, medical researchers freely
and routinely used biological samples obtained from patients for
research. 64 In Moore, however, the researchers not only developed a
stable cell line from Moore's biological materials, they patented that
66
line. 65 The Moore case has generated scores of law review articles,

and Moore's physicians engaged in a series of unconscionable and
unethical acts for which the California Supreme Court recognized a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty. 67 Few scholars, however, focus on
the fact that when Moore believed that the medical researchers were
61 See, e.g., U.N. Conference on Gov't and Dev., June 3-14, 1992, Report Volume
III: Statements Made by Heads of State or Government at the Summit Segment of the Conference,
189, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. III) (1993) [hereinafter U.N. Conference Report], available at http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N93/373/95/pdf/N9337395.pdf?OpenElement.
62

793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).

63

Id. at 481-82.

64 See id. at 494-95 (describing large tissue repositories and the widespread free
sharing between researchers of human cell lines); 1 ARTHUR B. LAFRANCE, BIOETHICS
§ 3.02[1], at 495 (1999); NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM., RESEARCH INVOLVING
HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS (1999),

reprinted in CARL

H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETH-

ICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 701 (2005) ("The most com-

mon sources of human biological materials are diagnostic or therapeutic
interventions in which diseased tissue is removed or tissue or other material is
obtained to determine the nature and extent of a disease. Even after the diagnosis or
treatment is complete, a portion of the specimen routinely is retained for future
clinical [or] research ...

purposes.").

65 U.S. Patent No. 4,438,032 (filed Jan. 6, 1983) (issued Mar. 20, 1984).
66 SeeALAN HYDE, BODIES OF LAW 67-74 (1997) (discussing some of the literature
and adding to it).
67 Moore, 793 P.2d at 483-88.
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using his tissue samples for academic and medical research 6 he, like
generations of patients before him, did not object to their doing so.
He brought suit asserting a property interest in his excised cells only
when he learned that the researchers had obtained an exclusive property interest, through patent, in the cell line derived from him. He
expressed outrage: "What the doctors had done, was to claim that...
69
my genetic essence[] was their invention and their property."
Moore's assertion of a private property right in his excised tissue arose
in response to the researchers' obtainment of a private property right
in his cell line.
Although the California Supreme Court refused to recognize
Moore's property interest in his excised spleen and other tissue samples, 70 as the patenting of cell lines and genetic sequences increased,
patients and patient groups continued to seek legal remedy when
7
their donated biological material found its way into patented goods. '
In Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute, Inc.,72 a
group of parents of children afflicted with the fatal Canavan disease
and several nonprofit patient groups sued a research physician and
73
his associated medical research institution for unjust enrichment.
For six years, Canavan families contributed blood, urine and autopsy
samples as well as epidemiological and medical information in an
effort to assist researchers discover the genes responsible for the disease.74 Using such samples and information, the research team successfully isolated the responsible gene. 75 This model of successful
collaboration broke down when the researchers patented the isolated
genetic sequence. They thereby "acquired the ability to restrict any
activity related to the Canavan disease gene, including ...carrier and
prenatal testing, gene therapy and other treatments ... and research

involving the gene and its mutations.

'7 6

The donors had provided the

68 Id. at 486 (explaining that the medical researchers had disclosed to Moore that
"they 'were engaged in strictly academic and purely scientific medical research"').
69 Lori B. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial Incentives with
Health Needs, 2 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 65, 93 (2002) (citing John Vidal &John
Carvel, Lambs to the Gene Market, GuARDIAN (London), Nov. 12, 1994, at 25).
70 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 488-93.
71 For a discussion of the growing movement to accord donors property rights
over genetic material, see Gary E. Marchant, Property Rights and Benefit-SharingforDNA
Donors?, 45 JURIMETRICSJ. 153, 159-65 (2005).
72 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
73 Id. at 1066.
74 Id. at 1067. The patient groups also contributed financially to the endeavor.
Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
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genetic material and other support in the belief that any genetic tests
"developed in connection with the research for which they were providing essential support would be provided on an affordable and
accessible basis, and that [the] research would remain in the public
domain." 77 Upon learning of the researchers' patent and their
attempts to enforce it, the furious parents and patient groups sued to
establish their own legal rights flowing from the materials that they
had donated. 78 In the words of one Canavan parent, "[our suit] is not
about the Canavan families wanting a piece of the pie. '79 Rather than
seeking a share of future royalties, in their complaint, the donors
sought to prevent the patent holders from restricting access to the
Canavan gene and from limiting genetic screening tests.80
Taking a different tack to establish a property interest, some
donors of biological material have insisted on co-ownership of any patents arising from biological materials that they contributed. For
example, Sharon Terry, whose two children suffered from the
debilitating PXE (pseudoxanthorma elasticum) disorder, donated tissue samples and began a tissue bank to collect additional samples
from other PXE patients. 8 1 In return, Terry became a co-owner of the
patent for the ultimately isolated PXE gene.8 2 When researchers initially asked Sharon Terry for tissue samples from her children, she
expressed surprise that researchers no longer shared existing samples
with each other.8 3 Terry and the PXE group that she founded have
obtained a property interest in the patented gene derived from their
donated biological specimens not for economic remuneration but
77

Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d 918,

921 (N.D. Ill. 2002).

78 The parties settled the case before trial. The settlement provided for licensefree use of the patented Canavan gene in research and stated that the plaintiffs would
no longer challenge the hospital's ownership and licensing of the gene patent. Joint
Press Release, Canavan Found. & Miami Children's Hosp. (Sept. 29, 2003), available
at http://www.canavanfoundation.org/news/09-03_miami.php.
79 Eliot Marshall, Families Sue Hospital, Scientist for Control of Canavan Gene, 290
SCIENCE 1062, 1062 (2000).
80 Id. In particular, the donors sought to block Miami Children's Hospital's commercial use of the patented gene and strenuously objected to the Hospital's limitation
on the number of tests that could be performed by each licensee and to its having
forced the Canavan Foundation to cease free genetic screening. Id.
81 Andrews, supra note 69, at 105.
82 Id.; Paul Smaglik, Tissue Donors Use Their Influence in Deal Over Gene Patent Terms,
407 NATURE 821, 821 (2000) (reporting that researchers who want to use the samples
in the PXE International blood and tissue bank must agree to the PXE group's terms,
which include joint ownership of any resulting intellectual property rights).
83 Andrews, supra note 69, at 105.
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rather to ensure that the gene and any resulting genetic tests remain
84
available for the benefit of those who suffer from PXE.
As Gary Marchant notes, it matters little whether the law automatically accords property rights in genetic material if donors insist on
such rights as a matter of contract. 8 5 The Canavan case as well as the
PXE precedent paved the way for property rights in genetic material
through contract. Indeed, several patient advocacy groups for genetic
diseases appear to be pursuing a PXE model for the sharing of genetic
material whereby groups of tissue donors obtain property rights in
86
donated DNA samples.
In all of the cases discussed above, donors sought to establish a
property or related legal interest in material that in a previous generation they would have freely made available, each in reaction to the
assertion of or threatened assertion of a property interest by others.
But for society's willingness to recognize a patent right in isolated
genetic sequences and cell lines, neither Moore nor Greenberg would
have brought suit nor would PXE patient advocates likely have pressed
for co-ownership of patents.
B.

Property Rights in Traditional Knowledge

Most knowledge that we use is both traditional and free. It consists of human innovation and insight developed over millennia and
passed down from generation to generation. A child born today will
benefit from language that she made no contribution to creating. She
will use numbers and a system of mathematics for free. She will enjoy
food, songs and dances developed by generations long gone. She will
inherit a range of methodologies from the tying of shoelaces to the
manipulation of a range of tools and objects. We take the free availability of most information as a given. No one thinks to thank the Chinese, let alone pay a royalty to China, whenever eating pasta. Mexico
holds no intellectual property right in the widespread use of aloe vera
in soaps and moisturizers. Our use of Arabic numerals generates no
84 Id.; Smaglik, supra note 82; see also Eliot Marshall, Patient Advocate Named CoInventor on Patent for the PXE Disease Gene, 305 SCIENCE 1226 (2004) (detailing the
involvement of Terry and PXE in the patent process).
85 Marchant, supra note 71, at 163.
86 See Genetic Alliance BioBank, http://www.biobank.org (last visited May 16,
2007); Donna M. Gitter, Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposalfor FederalRecognition of
Human Research Participants'PropertyRights in Their Biological Material,61 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 257, 318-19 (2004) (indicating that patient advocacy groups for autism and
juvenile diabetes are pursuing biorepositories for genetic material); Marchant, supra
note 71, at 164 (noting that several patient advocacy groups are pursuing genetic
sample repositories following the PXE model).
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royalties for Arab nations nor do parents pay a royalty to Israel whenever they name a child Jacob or Hannah.
Yet, today many nations demand the development of intellectual
property regimes to cover "traditional knowledge." 87 A flurry of international activity has materialized on this issue. In 2000, the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) established an intergovernmental committee to address the protection of traditional knowledge, innovations and creativity, and expressions of folklore. 8 In
1999, the Parties to the CBD established a working group to address
traditional knowledge issues, 89 and the 1992 CBD itself exhorts
nations to respect and protect traditional knowledge. 90 The CBD
working group has met four times, and numerous regional and
experts meetings have convened on the topic as well. 9 1 Even the
World Trade Organization has taken up the issue, calling upon the
TRIPS Council "to examine . . . the protection of traditional knowl-

edge and folklore."9 2 A study by WIPO indicated that the majority of
countries surveyed believe in the need for an international agreement
for the protection of expressions of folklore. Several nations, such as
Brazil and Panama, have already enacted measures purporting to pro93
tect traditional knowledge.
87 Nations have yet to agree on a consistent definition of traditional knowledge.
WIPO has defined traditional knowledge as "tradition-based literary, artistic or scientific works; performances; inventions; scientific discoveries; designs; marks, names and
symbols; undisclosed information; and, all other tradition-based innovations and creations resulting from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic
fields." WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS 25 (2001), available at http://www.
wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ffm/report/final/pdf/partl .pdf.
88 WIPO Intergovernmental Committee, http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/igc/ (last
visited May 16, 2007).
89 Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Bratislava,
Slovk., June 15, 1998, Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the
Convention on BiologicalDiversity, available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/
cop-04/official/cop-04-27-en.pdf.
90 CBD, supra note 49, art. 8(j).
91 See CBD, Meetings and Documents, http://www.biodiv.org/programmes/
socio-eco/traditional/meetings.shtml (search "subject" for "Article 80): Traditional
Knowledge, Innovations and Practices" and "Year" for "<previous meetings>"). The
working group met in 2000, 2002, 2003 and 2006. Id.
92 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/
MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto-e/minist-e/min0l-e/mindecl-ehtm.
93 WIPO, Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Prop. and Genetic Res.,
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Information on NationalExperiences with the Intellectual Property Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 39-90, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/INF/2
(July 7-15, 2003) (reproducing national statutes such as Panama Law No. 20 on the
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What has occurred to cause nations to demand the extension of
intellectual property rights to tradition? Anthropologist Michael
Brown observes that " [i]n the late 1980s, ownership of knowledge and
artistic creations traceable to the world's indigenous societies
emerged, seemingly out of nowhere, as a major social issue." 94 However,
something did happen in the late 1980s that likely engendered such
demands: the internationalization of intellectual property. In the late
1980s, the United States began to impose trade sanctions against
countries that accorded little or no protection to U.S. intellectual
property goods, pursuant to a new U.S. law called "Special Clause
301."9 5 As mentioned earlier, the United States also made trade with
it conditioned upon the granting of intellectual property rights in a
number of bilateral agreements. 9 6 Moreover, in 1986 and 1987, the
United States and the European Union linked intellectual property
and trade in the negotiating mandate for the Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.9 7 The 1994 adoption of the
TRIPS Agreement, which emerged from the Uruguay Round,
required countries to put in place, as a condition of participating in
the world trading system, copyright, patent, trademark and trade
secret laws.9 8 Beginning in the late 1980s, developing countries were
forced to extend a host of intellectual property protection to a vast
Special Intellectual Property Regime Upon the Collective Rights of Indigenous Communities for the Protection of their Cultural Identity and their Traditional Knowledge, Ley No. 20, de 26 de junio de 2000; Brazil Provisional Measure; Peru Law No.
27811, Ley No. 27811, de 10 de agosto de 2002; Law Introducing a Protection Regime
for the Collective Knowledge of Indigenous Peoples Derived from Biological
Resources, Medida Provis6ria No. 2.186-16, de 23 de agosto de 2001 (Brazil), available
at http://www.wipoint/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo-grtkf ic_5/wipogrtkf_ic 5_inf_2.
pdf.
94 MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE?, at ix (2003) (emphasis
added).
95 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2242(a),
2412(b) (2) (1998); Kim Newby, The Effectiveness of Special 301 in Cheating Long Term
Copyright Protectionfor U.S. Companies Overseas, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 29,

32-62 (1995); Shell, supra note 46, at 843-44. Under this clause, the United States
imposed trade sanctions on a number of developing countries, including Argentina,
Brazil and China. Remigius N. Nwabueze, Ethnopharmacology, Patents and the Politics of
Plants' Genetic Resources, 11 CARDOZOJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 585, 592 (2003). The U.S.

Trade Representative also identified India, Japan and Thailand as either priority
countries or on the priority watch list for trade sanctions due to inadequate protection of intellectual property. Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrentsin the International
Intellectual Property Regime, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 323, 361-62 (2004).
96 See supra note 46.

97 Helfer, supra note 46, at 20-21.
98 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 47, at 321-53. As of February 2007, 150 nations
have joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) and are hence bound by the
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range of knowledge that had hitherto remained free in their countries. They responded to these first generation intellectual property
rights by demanding in numerous international fora the development
of second generation intellectual property rights which would propertize traditional knowledge generated in their countries that had previously remained open.
One can see this nexus between the internationalization of Western intellectual property protection and the movement to propertize
traditional knowledge in multiple contexts. For example, developing
countries strongly object to the requirement that they extend patent
protection to pharmaceutical goods. 99 This requirement appeared in
several pre-TRIPS bilateral agreements, and the TRIPS Agreement
mandates such protection. 10 0 In turn, developing country demands
for the extension of intellectual property protection to traditional
knowledge often concern the protection of folk remedies. 10 1
Developing countries also strongly object to the extension of
intellectual property protection to plants. While most developed
TRIPS Agreement. See WTO, Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis.e/tif e/org6_e.htm (last visited May 16, 2007).
99 See, e.g., Nadia Natasha Seeratan, Comment, The Negative Impact of Intellectual
Property Patent Rights on Developing Countries:An Examination of the Indian Pharmaceutical
Industry, 3 SCHOLAR 339, 347 (2001); Global Coal. Against the Indian Patent Amendment, 26 February, Global Day of Action Against "TRIPs+", The Indian Patent Ordinance (Feb. 9, 2005), http://www.health-now.org/site/article.php?articleld=414&
menuld=13 (describing extensive protests against TRIPS conforming amendments in
the pharmaceutical area); Amit Sen Gupta, Indian Patent Act-Jeopardizing the Lives
of Millions (June 22, 2005), http://phm-india.org/issues/patents/indianpatentact.
html; Prasanna Saligram, The Other Tsunami, http://www.shaii.org/index.php?
option=com-content&task=view&id=54 (characterizing TRIPS implementing legislation as a "tsunami"). See generally MARTINJ. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
PATENT LAW 59-60 (2d ed. 2003) (stating that many developing countries did not
extend patent protection to drugs and widely manufactured them; the TRIPS Agreement was of great importance for the pharmaceutical industry); Martin J.Adelman &
Sonia Baldia, Prospects and Limits of the PatentProvision in the TRIPS Agreement: The Case
ofIndia, 29 VAND.J.TRANSNAT'L L. 507, 524-32 (1996) (discussing the pharmaceutical
industry in India and the effect of TRIPS).
100 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 47, art. 27, at 332-33; see also Adelman & Baldia,
supra note 99, at 529 ("TRIPS requires India to establish ... a patent system that will
provide effective protection for new drugs and the processes for making them.").
101 See, e.g., Gerard Bodeker, Traditional Medical Knowledge, Intellectual Property
Rights & Benefit Sharing, 11 CARDOZOJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 785, 786-89 (2003); Michael
J. Huft, Indigenous Peoples and DrugDiscovery Research: A Question of Intellectual Property
Rights, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1678, 1700 (1995) (discussing how the antimalarial drug
quinine, derived from the bark of South American Cinchona trees, was first used by
the indigenous peoples of Peru); Shayana Kadidal, Note, Plants, Poverty, and Pharmaceutical Patents, 103 YALE L.J. 223, 258 n.176 (1993).
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countries eventually joined the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV Convention)10 2 that
required countries to extend intellectual property protection to new
plant varieties, prior to the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, virtually no developing countries had joined. 10 3 As developed countries
successfully pressed for property rights over plants through the International Undertaking, pre-TRIPS bilateral pressure and finally
through the TRIPS Agreement itself, developing countries reacted by
demanding new legal protection for the traditional contributions of
farmers and farming communities who had improved crops over generations. Thus, they responded to the added Annex to the International Undertaking that accommodated plant breeders' property
rights 0 4 with the addition of an Annex calling for the recognition of
"Farmers' Rights." 10 5 Farmers' Rights recognized the historical and
continued contribution of farmers to the development of crops. 10 6
In response to requirements that developing countries extend
copyright protection to artistic works, these countries now demand
that some kind of property right extend to traditional songs and
dances that originated in their countries. Indeed, furor over the use
of traditional folklore like dance and song often erupt when a Western artist obtains a copyright on a product that incorporates folklore.
For example, the German singer Enigma's incorporation of the native
Taiwanese Song ofJoy into his copyrighted song Return to Innocence gen-

erated uproar, even though a group of native Taiwanese had publicly
performed the song in music halls across Europe. 10 7 Though now settled, the incident would engender even greater consternation today
now that China and Taiwan must grant copyright protection to
Enigma's song pursuant to the TRIPS Agreement.1 8
Even the language used by those demanding the creation of intellectual property rights over traditional knowledge indicates the rela102
103
104

See supra note 54.
Roht-Arriaza, supra note 56, at 941 n.114.
FAt Res. 4/89, supra note 57.

105

International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, FAO Conference Res.

5/89, at 10, 25th Sess. (Nov. 29, 1989) [hereinafter FAO Res. 5/89], availableat ftp://
ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/iu/iutextE.pdf. The Annex on Farmer Rights was in addition to
the Annex on Sovereign Rights discussed earlier. See supra note 59 and accompanying
text.
106 FAt Res. 5/89, supra note 105.
107 The performances were at the behest of the Chinese and French Cultural Ministries. Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in
Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 176-77 (2000).
108 China and Chinese Taipei (Taiwan) joined the WTO on December 11, 2001
and January 1, 2002, respectively. WTO, supra note 98.
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tionship between the internationalization of intellectual property and
the demand to fashion new intellectual property rights to cover traditional knowledge. Developed countries and their companies repeatedly decried the widespread copying of Western drugs, movies, songs
and software as "piracy."' 10 9 Mimicking such characterization, those
advocating the creation of property rights over traditional knowledge
reciprocally characterize the uncompensated use of traditional knowledge as "piracy."1 10
While the national governments of developing countries respond
to the internationalization of intellectual property by demanding new
forms of intellectual property, the demands by indigenous groups for
the protection of their traditional knowledge, while sometimes reactive to Western intellectual property, can stem from other concerns.
For example, indigenous groups sometimes seek to protect and control knowledge that they consider sacred or private.'
They may also
seek to prevent persons from fraudulently depicting an item as an
authentic native craft. Addressing these concerns, however, does not
require the creation of new property rights but can be met with legis112
lation that prohibits certain bad acts.
Demsetz's thesis largely explains why developed countries have in
the last several decades greatly expanded intellectual property rights
both in their countries and around the world.' 1 3 As the economies of
these countries came increasingly to depend less on the manufacture
109 See, e.g., Special 301 and the Fight Against TradePiracy: HearingBefore the Subcomm.
on International Trade of the S. Comm. on Finance, 103d Cong. 19 (1993) (testimony of
Ira S. Shapiro, General Counsel, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative); Newby,
supra note 95, at 44 n.91, 48 (discussing the Business Software Alliance's estimates
that "software piracy in China costs U.S. industry $322 million each year and ... that
there is a 94% software piracy rate in that country" and statements by music industry
members objecting to American creativity being "pirated," "counterfeited" or "ripped
off"); Jon Newton, Movie Studios Poised for Piracy Fight, TECHNEWSWORLD, Aug. 30,
2005, http://www.technewsworld.com/story/45777.html.
110 See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SovrwARE AND SPLEENS 121, 126 n.14 (1996);
VANDANA SHIVA, BIopRAcy 10-13 (1997).
111 See BROWN, supra note 94, at 11-42; Christine Haight Farley, ProtectingFolklore of
Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1, 13 (1997); see
also Daniel J. Gervais, Spiritual But Not Intellectual? The Protection of Sacred Intangible
Traditional Knowledge, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 467, 478 (2003) (defining
sacred traditional knowledge and examining its relationships with IP law).
112 See, e.g., Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. § 305(a) (2000). This
statute prohibits the representation of a work as a native craft when it is not and
provides for criminal and civil penalties for such misrepresentation. For a description
of the Act and its history, see generally Roberto Iraola, The Civil and Criminal Penalty
Provisions of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 36 CUMB. L. REv. 293 (2006).
113 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
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of articles and more on the generation of innovative drugs, movies,
software, music and other intellectual property goods, they stood to
gain by developing property rights that would enable their corpora14
tions and citizens to capture the commercial value of these goods."
As with the emergence of property rights over raw genetic material,
Demsetz's thesis does not explain the sudden demand by developing
countries for ownership rights in tradition. Traditional knowledge
did not suddenly become commercially valuable in the late 1980s.
Communities that generated such knowledge and those that interacted with them had always used this knowledge and applied it in
commercial ways. Classic explanations for intellectual property also
fail to explain this development. According intellectual property protection to tradition does not encourage new works. These works
already exist. In fact, granting these rights can hinder the development of new works because people can no longer draw upon as rich a
public domain. Moral rights justifications also have little explanatory
purchase because the people who created the traditional works are
long gone. Instead, the demand by developing countries for the creation of property rights over traditional know-how primarily arose in
reaction to the worldwide expansion of Western intellectual property
rights. The internationalization of intellectual property began a chain
reaction of propertization that not only encompassed new technologies and creative works, but also innovations and expressions existent
for centuries.
C.

The Patent Paradox

One can see the chain reaction dynamic operating, though in a
different way, in the so-called patent paradox. The patent paradox
constitutes one of the most puzzling phenomena of today's patent
activity. In the United States, as well as in other countries, the amount
of patent activity has risen dramatically even though, paradoxically,
the expected value of individual patents has diminished. 1 15 Patent filings generally rose by about forty percent between 1998 and 2003.116
In addition, "patent intensity-the measure of patents obtained per
research and development dollar-approximately doubled from the
mid 1980s to the late 1990s. '11 7 Meanwhile, empirical research indi114 See, e.g., SusAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW 8 (2003) (discussing how
private corporations were the main proponents for stronger intellectual property protection in the TRIPS Agreement).
115 Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 22, at 5.
116 Id. at 5 n.2.
117 Id.

1942

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 82:5

cates the low average expected value of the overwhelming majority of
patents. 1 8 Empirical studies set the average value of patents at
$7,500-$25,000.119 This generally represents less than their average
acquisition costs, which conservatively run $10,000-$30,000 per patent prosecuted in the United States and several times that for inventions prosecuted in multiple countries.1 20 Estimates suggest that
about 1.5% of patents are litigated, of which courts deem almost half
invalid, 121 and only a small additional number are licensed for royalty
(as opposed to cross-licensed).122 Strikingly, most patentees view their
patents to hold so little value that they let them lapse before the end
123
of their term rather than pay the periodic maintenance fees.
Scholars have offered several theories to explain why so many
seek patents, notwithstanding the low expected value of the over118 Id. at 5.
119 Id. at 5 n.3; see also Mark Schankerman, How Valuable is Patent Protection?Estimates by Technology Field, 29 RANDJ. ECON. 77, 93 (1998) (concluding that "most patents have very little private value" with the median private value of patent rights, in
1980 dollars, amounting to only $1631 in the pharmaceutical industry, $1594 in the
chemical field, $2930 in the mechanical field and $3159 in electronics excluding
Japan).

120 Kimberley A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1526
(2005); Parchomovsky & Wagner, supranote 22, at 15, 16 n.53 (estimating the cost of
obtaining protection in ten European countries at over $95,000) (citing Erwin F. Berrier, Jr., Global Patent Costs Must Be Reduced, 36 IDEA 473, 479 (1996)).
121 SeeJohn R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents,26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205-06 (1998) (reporting that in cases that result in a
final judgment on validity, courts find the patents invalid forty-six percent of the
time).
122 Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495,
1507 (2001).
123 See Moore, supra note 120, at 1526 (stating that "53.71% of all patentees do
allow their patents to expire for failure to pay one of their maintenance fees"). Maintenance fees in the United States are $830 at three and a half years, $1900 at seven
and a half years, and $2910 at eleven and a half years. 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2000). This
trend appears in other countries as well. A study of French and German patents
showed that only seven percent of the former and eleven percent of the latter were
maintained until their expiration date. Ariel Pakes, Patentsas Options:Some Estimates of
the Value of Holding European Patent Stocks, 54 ECONOMETRiCA 755, 774 (1986) (detail-

ing a study which covered over a million French patents applied for between 1951 and
1979 and approximately 500,000 German patents issued between 1952 and 1972),
cited in Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 22, at 114 n.49; see also Jean Olson
Lanjouw, Patent Protection in the Shadow of Infringement: Simulation Estimates of Patent
Value, 65 REV. ECON. STUD. 671, 693 (1998), cited in Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra
note 22, at 114 n.49. Lanjouw's study of a sample of German patents filed between
1953 and 1988 showed that less than fifty percent of the patents were maintained for
over ten years and less than thirty-five percent were maintained until the statutory
expiration date.
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whelming majority of them. These include (a) the lottery theory,
which likens each patent to a potential winning lottery ticket; 124 (b)
the signaling theory, which suggests that firms secure patents to provide information to outside investors; 125 (c) the internal metric the-

ory, which posits that patents provide a means to measure employee
performance;12 6 and (d) the patent portfolio theory, which argues
that patents of little individual worth become valuable when bundled
together in a portfolio. 127 Each of these theories helps explain the
patent paradox.
The chain reaction theory adds to these hypotheses by suggesting
that today people and corporations also seek patents because others
have done so. Patent activity begets patent activity. The frenzy to
obtain patent rights over genetic fragments illustrates this copycat
behavior. In June of 1991, Dr. Craig Venter, on behalf of the National
Institutes of Health (NIH), applied for patents on some 2700 gene
fragments of unknown function that he had sequenced using automated sequencing methods.12 8 These new sequencing methods enabled the rapid identification of thousands of genetic fragments per
month. 129 NIH's attempt to patent and hence control a large quantity
of genetic material whose function it had not identified was unprecedented. Academics and industry groups immediately and harshly
124 Individuals and corporations obtain patents in the hope that one of them will
turn into a winning lottery ticket. Because they cannot know in advance which of
their patents will ultimately prove the winner, they patent everything. F.M. Scherer,
The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3, 11
(Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) (showing that "a minority of 'spectacular
winners' appropriate the lion's share of" patent rewards).
125 The signaling theory suggests that patents provide cheap, valuable information
about the invention or firm to, for example, potential investors. See Clarisa Long,
Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 625, 643-64 (2002).
126 See Richard C. Levin, A New Look at the Patent System, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 199,
200-01 (1986); Wesley M. Cohen et al., ProtectingTheir IntellectualAssets: Appropriability
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.

Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at http://www.dklevine.com/
archive/cohen-survey.pdf. In this connection, it bears noting that even universities
evaluate professors on the number of patents that they have received. See, e.g.,
Rutgers University, Form No. l-a, http://ruweb.rutgers.edu/oldqueens/docs/20062007/gen/Form%201-A.doc (evaluating professors for promotion and tenure in part
on the number of patents that they have received).
127 Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 22, at 29-31. For a discussion of the
strengths and the limits of most of these theories, see id. at 19-27.
128 Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual Property Rights in Genes and
Gene Fragments:A Registration Solution for Expressed Sequence Tags, 85 IOWA L. REv. 735,
750 (2000); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and

the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 77, 98-99 (1999).
129 Holman & Munzer, supra note 128, at 750.
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denounced its action, and uncertainty existed as to whether the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) would even issue patents on such
gene fragments.1 3 0 Despite these criticisms, legal uncertainty and the
enormous expense of preparing and filing patent applications, once
word of NIH's applications got out, the lemmings began their march.
Applications covering hundreds of thousands of genetic fragments
began to pour into the PTO. By 1996, Incyte Pharmaceuticals alone
131
had filed patent applications covering 400,000 genetic fragments.
13
2
Many patent applications extended over 2000 pages.
This immense
flood of patent application activity confronted the PTO with a ninetyyear backlog. 3 3 Widespread criticism caused NIH to eventually withdraw its original and subsequent applications.13 4 NIH's applications,
however, had already initiated a chain reaction. Thousands of applications continued to pour into the PTO, notwithstanding NIH's
withdrawals.
The increasingly widespread use of defensive patenting, which
scholars have identified as a factor contributing to today's high levels
of patent activity, further evidences a chain reaction dynamic. 135 Cor-

porations and individuals obtain patents for maintenance in a patent
arsenal. Should someone sue or threaten to sue a corporation for
patent infringement, the corporation countersues or threatens to
countersue for infringement of one of the patents that it has warehoused in its arsenal. The corporations hope that, in the face of this
actual or threatened lawsuit, the plaintiff will dismiss its suit, and each
corporation will return to business as usual. In the alternative, the
corporation uses patents in its arsenal to cross-license its technology
with other corporations.1 36 Each corporation thereby avoids litiga130
131
132
133
134

Id.
Eliot Marshall, Patent Office Faces 90-Year Backlog, 272
Holman & Munzer, supra note 128, at 754.
Marshall, supra note 131, at 643.
Holman & Munzer, supra note 128, at 751.

SCIENCE

643, 643 (1996).

135 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION 3-33 (2003) [hereinafter FTC
Report], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (describing
the use of defensive patenting); John H. Barton, Reforming the Patent System, 287 SciENCE 1933, 1933 (2000) (describing how firms try to protect themselves from patent
infringement lawsuits by assembling patent portfolios-frequently on very minor
inventions-"so they can deter litigation through the threat of reciprocal suit");
Cohen et al., supra note 126, at 17 (explaining that one of the reasons why firms
patent inventions is to prevent infringement lawsuits and identifying defensive patenting as a primary factor causing the increase in patent activity, despite the fact that
research and development executives do not perceive patents to be one of the best
means of obtaining returns on their research and development investment).
136 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 11, at 61.
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tion. The ultimate outcome does not much differ from a situation
where neither corporation had obtained the patents at issue.
The defensive patenting scenario currently affects several important industries. These include the semiconductor industry, 3 7 which
accounts for some six percent of all issued patents. 138 It also includes
the computer software industry, which receives at least five percent of
issued patents, as well as the computer hardware sector. 1 39 Some fear
that the biotechnology industry risks falling into a defensive patenting
dynamic. 140 In the defensive patenting world in which these industries operate, patent activity occurs in response to prior patent activity.
In chain reaction fashion, one patent begets another which begets
another still and so on. Individuals, research institutions and corporations obtain these reactive patents not because of the patents' potential positive value, such as their ability to generate license revenue or
to provide a manufacturer with a competitive edge, but rather because
14 1
Comothers in their field have obtained patents or might do so.
mentators consistently liken the situation to an arms race, the quintessential example of a wasteful tit-for-tat, rather than to an enterprise
137 SeeJohn H. Barton, Antitrust Treatment of Oligopolies with Mutually Blocking Patent
Portfolios, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 851, 854-55 (2001) (describing how companies in the
semiconductor industry amass patent portfolios for defensive purposes); Bronwyn H.
Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of
Patentingin the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101, 107-09
(2001) (discussing how semiconductor manufacturers "harvest" more patents for
their existing research and development both as a defensive strategy and to use as
bargaining chips in cross-licensing arrangements with other patent holders); Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, Patent Litigation in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, in PATENTS IN
THE KNOWLDEGE-BASED ECONOMY 180, 189-92, 207-10 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen
A. Merrill eds., 2003).
138 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An EmpiricalExploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REv. 2099, 2148 tbl.1 (2000) (finding that semiconductor patents accounted for 6.2% of all patents issued in the period that they
studied).
139 FTC Report, supra note 135, at 26 (many companies in the semiconductor,
computer hardware and computer software industries have responded to the risk of
unintentional and sometimes unavoidable" patent infringement litigation by filing
hundreds of patent applications each year, which they "can use defensively against
firms threatening infringement actions" (citations omitted)); see also id. at 6-7; (discussing defensive patenting) Carlos M. Correa, Internationalizationof the Patent System
and New Technologies, 20 Wis. INT'L L.J. 523, 538 (2002) (citing study that showed that
software patents accounted for five percent of all patents issued by 2000). Allison and
Lemley found that computer-related technology, which includes software, accounted
for sixteen percent of issued patents in the random sample that they studied. Allison
& Lemley, supra note 138, at 2148 tbl.1.
140 See Barton, supra note 135, at 1933-34.
141 See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.

1946

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 82:5

designed to promote innovation by capturing the actual or the potential value of technological advances.
II.

EXPLANATIONS FOR THE CHAIN REACTION EVOLUTION OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS

Why do individuals, corporations and nations respond to the
development or expansion of property rights by demanding the creation of or pursuing additional property rights? Three explanations
follow.
A.

Group Behavior Theory: The Imitation Impulse

In sandboxes and playgrounds throughout the world, one can
observe the following dynamic. A toy sits in a corner untouched. It is
commons property. Children know that the toy is available for the use
of all and subject to the exclusive use of no one. Hours go by. Not a
child shows the slightest interest in the object. Suddenly, one child
begins to play with the toy. Within minutes, other children gather. A
fight frequently ensues as the children now battle over something that
they showed no interest in some fifteen minutes earlier. 142 Why?
Why does a song suddenly become popular? Why do people join
a standing ovation, even if they experienced the performance as mediocre or bad? Imitation is an important and powerful social phenomenon, as has been demonstrated by numerous studies in zoology,
sociology and social psychology. 143 Group behavior theorists Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch show that decisionmakers at some
point will ignore their own information and pattern their behavior on
the actions of those before them. 14 4 This phenomenon, which they
call an information cascade, explains why societies converge on a
norm and, on the basis of little information, will systematically make
dubious choices. Their models demonstrate both that information
cascades will eventually occur and that they often will result in impru145
dent outcomes.
142 I am grateful to Professor Ellen Goodman for pointing to the sandbox
dynamic.
143 S. Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and CulturalChange as
Information Cascades, 100J. POL. ECON. 992, 995 (1992); see also Gregory S. Berns et al.,
Neurobiological Correlates of Social Conformity and IndependenceDuring Mental Rotation, 58
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 245, 248, 252 (2005) (identifying a neurobiological basis for
social conformity which indicates that individuals follow others even when the group
is wrong because the group alters their perception rather than because they consciously decide to capitulate).
144 See Bikhchandani et al., supra note 143, at 996-97.
145 Id. at 1016.
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Building on this work, John Miller and Scott Page recently tackled the standing ovation problem. 146 They summarize the problem as
follows: A theater performance ends. The audience begins to
applaud. The applause builds up tentatively and a few audience members stand. "Does a standing ovation ensue or does the enthusiasm
fizzle?"' 14 7 Using computational models, Miller and Page found that
the system often converged on the wrong equilibrium. Most people
stood even though most did not like the performance. 4 8 They also
discovered that greater pressure to conform led to less efficient aggregation of information. 49 In addition, they found that people sitting
in the front had a large impact, as almost everyone patterned their
150
behavior off them.
Many situations fall prone to a group behavior dynamic. Mass
communication, international travel and the prodigious number of
international negotiations and international organizations mean that
people and countries quickly learn of and are influenced by developments occurring in other places. Governments rapidly know of legal
developments in other countries, and international negotiations take
place in a face-to-face environment with attendant group dynamic
pressures. Corporations readily learn of each others' patenting activity. One no longer needs to scour government document depositories
to find patents. Several clicks on the PTO website yield a bounty of
51
information, and newspapers routinely report patenting trends.
Corporations, research institutions, nations and individuals know
more than ever before what each other are up to and have greater
susceptibility to copycat group behavior dynamics.
146 John H. Miller & Scott E. Page, The Standing Ovation Problem, 9
(2004).

147
148

COMPLEXITY

8

Id. at 8.
Id. at 15.

149 Id.
150 Id. at 14-15. In addition to these socially demonstrated models of lemminglike behavior, a scientific theory of imitation suggests that humans behave like atoms.
Mark Buchanan, Bubble Physics, BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 7, 2005), available at
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2005/08/07/bubblephysics/.
Two French scientists recently noted that atoms influence each other in their directions and interactions. They found that "the way collections of atoms behave often
depends only very weakly on the precise details of how the individual atoms interact
with one another." Id. Directing their observations to the social world, these scientists concluded that imitation basically exaggerates any collective social response to
real world trends. In other words, "imitation leads to distortion." Id.
151 See, e.g., Floyd Norris, You Can't Use that Tax Idea. It's Patented, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
20, 2006, at Cl.
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Group behavior theory helps explain why property rights evolve
in a chain reaction. Some individuals begin to assert a property interest in a good. Others cue their behavior off of these initial actors and
assert a property interest as well. No cost-benefit calculation takes
place. This dynamic sheds light on the patent paradox. Some begin
to seek a patent over an innovation hitherto believed unpatentable,
such as a business method or a gene fragment. Others cue their
behavior off these propertization pioneers and seek patent rights for
themselves as well. The patent application deluge that followed NIH's
applications for patents on gene fragments exemplifies this group
behavior dynamic. As a leader in the scientific community, NIH
served the societal function of a front row theater-goer standing to
applaud. Other researchers and institutions followed its lead. The
ongoing movement for the creation of sui generis intellectual property regimes over traditional knowledge may also have a group behavior dynamic. If enough prominent developing countries call for such
rights, other developing countries follow suit.
Demsetz pointed to the Montagnais Indians of Quebec to illustrate his theory. 1 52 Traditionally, the Montagnais had an open access
hunting regime.15 3 By the beginning of the eighteenth century, they
154
began to allocate exclusive hunting rights among tribe members.
According to Demsetz, they did so because the introduction of the
155
colonial commercial fur trade increased the economic value of furs.
With the advent of this commercial trade, the benefits of a closed
property regime became greater than the benefits of the open access
hunting regime that preceded it.1 56 Consequently, the Montagnais, in

efficiency maximizing fashion, adopted private property rights over
the land containing beavers. 157 As Thomas Merrill points out, even if
one accepts Demsetz's explanation of why property rights evolve, the
152 Demsetz, supra note 12, at 351-52.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 352 (citing Eleanor Leacock, The Montagnais 'Hunting Territory' and the
Fur Trade, 78 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST MEMOIR 15 (1954)).
155 Id. at 351-52.
156 An often mentioned application of Demsetz's thesis involves the advent of
barbed wire in the American West. This technological advance engendered the establishment of property rights in land for grazing cattle. It did so not by increasing the
value of cattle but by reducing the cost of establishing a property regime in grazing
land. Prior to barbed wire, people found it too costly to enclose cattle and to establish
fixed land rights for ranchers. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property
and Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1, 9-10 nn.34-35 (2003); Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third World Tragedy of Contested Access, 115
YALE L.J. 996, 1004 (2006).
157 Demsetz, supra note 12, at 351-52.
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process through which they evolve has long remained "a black
box."' 58 How does a society transition from point A, a situation without exclusive property rights, to point B, a situation with extensive
property rights?
While no one can speak for the Montagnais, group behavior
insights can help unravel the transition process mystery. The commercial fur trade likely explains why some Montagnais, seeking to
profit from the trade, sought a property interest in the land containing beavers. Their demands for property rights, particularly if they
held positions of prominence in the community, may have generated
a chain reaction of similar property claims by others. These others
likely had little information about the value of fur relative to the cost
of controlling it. Rather, they patterned their behavior on the behavior of those that preceded them. Demsetz explicitly refrained from
taking a position on whether adjustments in property rights would
result from a conscious endeavor. 159 Group behavior insights as well
as the case studies discussed above indicate that in many cases it is
highly unlikely that the affected community makes a conscious costbenefit calculation. 160 The emergence of private property or other
more exclusive property regimes simply may be a bad idea whose time
has come.
B.

Breach of a Cooperative Norm

As John Dawson observed three decades ago, "Uncompensated
gains are pervasive and universal; our well-being and survival depend
on them."1 6 1 And so we share. Indeed, experiments show that people
cooperate and forgo free riding much more often than economists
predict. 162 In fact, if most people cooperate and share "the social
I 63
meaning of non-cooperation is greed."

However, if some stop sharing and cooperating, preferring
instead to claim certain property or knowledge as exclusively their
own, continuing to share under such circumstances transforms the
good public citizen into a public patsy. Game theorists have shown
that in a repeated game, players will cooperate in the first period, but
will defect in subsequent periods if the other player defected in the
158 Merrill, supra note 9, at S336; see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 49
("[T]he mechanism by which private property comes about remains a mystery.").
159 Demsetz, supra note 12, at 350.
160 See supra notes 142-54 and accompanying text.
161 John P. Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1409, 1412
(1974).
162 Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 945 (1996).
163 Id.
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immediately preceding period. 1 64 Absent such defection, they will
15
continue to cooperate. 6
Underlying the creation of property rights over raw genetic and
biological material is a desire by those demanding such rights that
others not exploit them. When individuals and corporations began to
patent isolated and purified genetic sequences, cell lines and living
organisms, those from whom the raw biological material came felt
exploited. 16 6 Nations with a history of colonial exploitation had a
heightened sensitivity to such exploitation. 167 They no longer viewed
the sharing of raw biological material as international collaboration
but rather as "biocolonialism." As the President of Tanzania said,
"[M]ost of us in developing countries find it difficult to accept the
notion that biodiversity should [flow freely to industrial countries]
while the flow of biological products from the industrial countries is
patented, expensive and considered the private property of the firms
that produce them. This asymmetry . . . is unjust."'1 68 Developing
countries created property rights over material that they had previously shared to prevent others from taking advantage of them.
A similar sentiment animates patient property claims to biological
specimens. Patients willingly donated biological specimens when they
believed they were contributing to a greater social good. 169 The
obtainment of patent rights by researchers and institutions over cell
lines and genetic sequences breached this cooperative spirit. Contributors, like those who joined the effort to find the gene responsible for
70
Canavan disease as well as John Moore, felt taken advantage of.'
Their fury and sense of violation do not stem from concern over lost
potential economic opportunities, but rather from being played the
patsy.
In the case of traditional knowledge, when developed countries
began to insist that developing countries cease copying intellectual
property goods developed in the West, developing countries
164

ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION

DoucLAs G.

BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORYAND THE LAW

118-20 (1984); see also

316 (1994) (calling this strategy

"tit-for-tat").
supra note 164, at 118-20.

165

AXELROD,

166

See supra notes 62-86 and accompanying text.

167
168

I thank Professor Tanya Hernandez for this point.
U.N. Conference Report, supra note 61, at 189; see also Craig D. Jacoby &

Charles Weiss, Recognizing Property Rights in Traditional Biocultural Contribution, 16
STAN. ENVTrL.

L.J. 74, 89 (1997) (quoting Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi's

statement to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development).
169 On the benefits of altruism, see RICHARD M. TITMUss, THE Grr RELATIONSHIP
195-246 (1971).
170 See supra notes 62-86 and accompanying text.
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expressed resentment over the knowledge that they had shared with
the West.1 71 It was one thing for societies effectively to share knowledge with each other. It was quite another for technologicallyadvanced societies to wrap their knowledge in a web of intellectual
property protections, while freely using the traditional knowledge of
their less developed counterparts.
C. Fear of Exclusion
Of property's attributes,1 7 2 most consider the right of the holder
to exclude others to be the most important. 173 In the case of intellectual property, the right to exclude is the central and, in the case of
patents, the only right accorded. 174 I suggest the following corollary:

Of property's attributes, the one most likely to inspire fear among
nonholders of a property interest is that they will be excluded from its
use. When some begin to demand and receive new property rights,
others naturally experience concern that they will no longer enjoy the
ability to use the previously common resource. They respond by
securing a property right for themselves in the good that is now the
new object of propertization. In the alternative, they demand the creation of new property rights over some related good that they can
exchange for access to the first object of propertization.

171 See infra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
172 Honor- identifies the following incidents of property: (1) the right to exclusive
possession; (2) the right to personal use and enjoyment; (3) the right to manage use
by others; (4) the right to the income from use by others; (5) the right to the capital
value, including alienation, consumption, waste or destruction; (6) the right to security (that is, immunity from expropriation); (7) the power of transmissibility by gift,
devise, or descent; (8) the lack of any term on these rights; (9) the duty to refrain
from using the object in ways that harm others; (10) the liability to execution for
repayment of debts; and (11) residual rights on the reversion of lapsed ownership
rights held by others. A.M. Honor6, Ownership, in OXFORo ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
107, 112-28 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961).
173 See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV 357, 374
(1954) (characterizing property as something "to which the following label can be
attached: To the world: Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may grant
or withhold"); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV.
730, 737-39 (1998) (arguing that "the right to exclude others ...is the sine qua non"
of property but also identifying other schools of thought which, while agreeing that
property rights generally involve some right to exclude, disagree that the right to
exclude is the core right).
174 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
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This fear animates much of the frenetic patent activity underlying
the patent paradox. 175 Companies and institutions feel compelled to
obtain patents over slight and even dubious innovations out of concern that if they do not have such patents, they will have no currency
to trade for access to other patented and potentially equally slight
innovations. As Internet Patent News Service Editor Gregory
Aharonian explains: "The big guys couldn't care less about the quality
of their patents .... They just want as many as possible because they

trade them like baseball cards. When you have a thousand patents
and your competition has 1500, you don't care what they are, you just
swap them."176 Fear of exclusion also helps to explain why so many
rushed to file patent applications over gene fragments. They feared
that unless they obtained such patents, those who did would exclude
them from entire fields of innovation.
The demand by developing countries for property rights over raw
biological material partly arose from their concern that patent holders
would exclude them from enjoying the benefits of technology, particularly biotechnology. 1 77 Developing countries sought property rights
over raw biological material partly to leverage such rights for access to
patented technologies. 178 The language and structure of the CBD
itself evidences the creation of sovereign property rights as a means of
leverage against other property rights. Article 15 of the CBD, entitled
"Access to Genetic Resources," goes hand in hand with Article 16,
entitled "Access to and Transfer of Technology." After effectively vesting national governments with the right to control access to genetic
resources,1 79 Article 15 stipulates that sovereigns should facilitate
access to such material. 8 0° Article 16 links such sharing with the sharing of technological innovations, particularly technologies which utilize provided genetic material.' 8 ' Together Articles 15 and 16 envision
175 One often sees today's patent environment described as a frenzy. See, e.g.,
Legal Resources for Surviving the Patenting Frenzy of the Internet, Bioinformatics,
and Electronic Commerce, http://www.bustpatents.com (last visited May 16, 2007).
176 Denise Caruso, Digital Commerce, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1999, at C4.
177 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
178 Id.
179 Article 15(1), "[r]ecognizing the sovereign fights of States over their natural
resources," states that "the authority to determine access to genetic resources rests
with the national governments," CBD, supra note 49, at 152, while Article 15(5) provides that access to this material requires the "prior informed consent of the [nation]
providing such resources." Id.
180 Id. art. 15(2), at 152 ("[E]ach Party shall endeavour to create conditions to
facilitate access to genetic resources.").
181 See id. at 153. Article 15(7) of the CBD states: "Each Contracting Party shall
take ... measures ...

with the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of
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a world where developing countries provide raw genetic material in
18 2
exchange for technological goods and know-how.
One can also see the development of property rights as a means
of leverage against other property rights in the renegotiation of the
International Undertaking. Following the entry into force of the
CBD, negotiations began to harmonize the International Undertaking
with the CBD. These negotiations centered on whether nations would
continue to share plant genetic material freely with each other to promote global food security or whether a more restrictive regime would
govern. During the negotiations, prominent developing country representatives repeatedly offered to provide access to the raw genetic
material of all plants in their countries, if developed countries would
183
provide access to patented agricultural goods.

research and development and the benefits arising from the ... utilization of genetic
resources with the [nation] providing such resources." Id. at 152. In Article 16(1),
the parties emphasize that technology "includes biotechnology," and undertake to
provide or facilitate access to "technologies that ... make use of genetic resources."
Id. at 153. Article 16(2) provides that access to and transfer of this technology "shall
be provided and/or facilitated under fair and most favourable terms, including on
concessional and preferential terms where mutually agreed," but where technology is
"subject to patents and other intellectual property rights, such access and transfer
shall be provided on terms which recognize and are consistent with the adequate and
effective protection of intellectual property rights." Id. at 153. Article 16(3) provides
that each party to the Convention shall take measures
with the aim that Contracting Parties, in particular those that are developing
countries, which provide access to genetic resources are provided access to
and transfer of technology which makes use of those resources, on mutually
agreed terms, including technology protected by patents and other intellectual property rights, where necessary through [financial mechanisms] and in
accordance with international law.
Id.
182 Other articles of the CBD also support this outcome. For example, Article
19(1) states that each party shall take measures "to provide for the effective participation in [its] biotechnological research activities" by parties who have provided access
to genetic resources, particularly developing country parties. Id. at 155. Meanwhile,
Article 19(2) requires parties to take practicable measures to promote "priority access
on a fair and equitable basis" to the results and benefits of biotechnologies to countries, particularly developing countries, that provided genetic resources used in those
technologies, provided such access is done on mutually agreed terms. Id.
183 1 participated in these negotiations and personally heard these interventions.
These negotiations ultimately resulted in the International Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture, Nov. 3, 2001, ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/it/
!TPGRe.pdf (last visited May 16, 2007).
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THREE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CHAIN REACTION EVOLUTION OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS

The above discussion shows how and why the creation of new
property rights can trigger a chain reaction of propertization, whereby
individuals and societies respond to these new or expanded rights by
demanding the generation of additional property rights. The chain
reaction theory for the evolution of property rights has three key
implications.
A.

Collateral and Unexpected Property Regimes

First, as demonstrated above, the creation of property rights in
one sphere may spawn the creation of property rights in a related,
though other, sphere. Importantly, those who demand the creation
of the initial rights, as well as the government actors who fashion these
rights, appear not to anticipate the wave of collateral property rights
that arises in response to their actions.
For example, the thousands of pages filed, read and debated in
the Chakrabarty proceedings address the moral, legal, social, environmental and economic aspects of extending patents to living organisms. Petitioner, the PTO, opposed such patents, inter alia, on the
grounds that such patents raised serious economic and social questions.'8 4 The Peoples Business Corporation argued that such patents
would concentrate wealth in a few multinational corporations,18 5 create biohazards' 86 and reduce biological diversity. 187 According to the
American Patent Law Association, biological patents would promote
innovation. 8 8 Meanwhile, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association found "no compelling economic, social, or moral reasons to distinguish" biotechnological inventions from other innovations. 8 9
Genentech emphasized the extraordinary benefits that biotechnology
would bring to humanity, 190 while another amicus discussed at length
the societal benefits of Chakrabarty's invention to a small Long Island
184 Brief for the Petitioner at 18-21, Diamond v. Bergy, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (No.
79-136), 1980 WL 339757.
185 Brief on Behalf of the Peoples Business Commission, Amicus Curiae at 9,
Parker v. Bergy, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (No. 79-136), 1979 WL 200005.
186 Id. at 18-21.
187 Id. at 7-9.
188 Brief on Behalf of the American Patent Law Ass'n, Inc., Amicus Curiae at 4,
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (No. 79-136), 1980 WL 339772.
189 Brief on Behalf of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Ass'n, Amicus Curiae at
13 n.21, Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (No. 79-136), 1980 WL 339771.
190 Brief on Behalf of Genentech, Inc., Amicus Curiae at 12, Chakrabarty,447 U.S.
303 (No. 79-136), 1980 WL 339766.
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shipping village.' 9' Not one brief opposing Chakrabarty's patent mentions that the extension of patents to life forms might, let alone
would, cause donors of raw biological samples, such as patients and
developing countries, to claim a responsive property right in these raw
materials. 192 Those involved in Chakrabarty,from the litigants, to the
amici, to the Supreme CourtJustices themselves, all believed that they
were simply deciding the extent to which property rights would
extend to man's handiwork. 19 3 No one anticipated that their decision
would alter the hitherto accepted norm of the relatively free availability of samples of nature's handiwork. Twenty-five years after
Chakrabarty, ownership increasingly constitutes the norm not only for
man-made living organisms, isolated genetic material and cell lines,
but also, unexpectedly, for samples of raw biological materials.
Similarly, those pressing for the international expansion of Western intellectual property rights do not appear to have anticipated
responsive demands for the creation of property rights over traditional knowledge. The legislative history of Special Clause 301 mentions no such prospect 94 Those negotiating the TRIPS Agreement
for the United States seemingly did not foresee the eventual responsive demand for intellectual property rights over traditional knowledge. In fact it does not appear that this response was even on their
radar screens. Commentators on the history of the TRIPS Agreement
do not mention traditional knowledge as an issue during the negotiations and confirm that calls to protect traditional knowledge came
later.' 9 5 In the same vein, when developed countries insisted on the
191

Brief of Cornell D. Cornish as Amicus Curiae at 8-13, Parker,447 U.S. 303 (No.

79-136), 1979 WL 200006.
192 Brief for the Respondent, Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (No. 79-136), 1980 WL
339758; Brief of Dr. George Pieczenik as Amicus Curiae, Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303
(No. 79-136), 1980 WL 339773; Brief on Behalf of the New York Patent Law Ass'n,
Inc., Amicus Curiae, Chakrabarty,447 U.S. 303 (No. 79-136), 1980 WL 3397669; Brief
Amicus Curiae of the Regents of the University of California, Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303 (No. 79-136), 1980 WL 339770; Brief of: Dr. Leroy E. Hood et al. as Amici Curiae,
Chakrabarty,447 U.S. 303 (No. 79-136), 1980 WL 339764; Brief on Behalf of the American Society for Microbiology, Amicus Curiae, Chakrabarty,447 U.S. 303 (No. 79-136),
1979 WL 200007.
193
Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 310.
194 The legislative history of Special 301 appears in H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at
550-87 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1583-1620.
195 See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 46, at 20-22; J.H. Reichmann, Universal Minimum
Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 IrV'L LAw. 345, 382-85 (1995) (discussing the overall history of the TRIPS
Agreement and the likely response of developing countries but not mentioning anything about traditional knowledge or restriction of access to biological materials); YtI,
supra note 95, at 357-70, 386-89 (discussing the history of TRIPS and mentioning
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acknowledgement of Breeders' Rights within the International Undertaking, they did not anticipate the responsive insistence by developing
19 6
countries on the recognition of Farmers' Rights.
B.

The Importance of First Movers

Second, the chain reaction theory for the evolution of property
ights indicates that those who first demand property rights play a critical and underestimated role in the evolution of property rights.
These propertization pioneers can trigger a chain reaction of
demands for similar or different yet related property rights. The role
that NIH played in the frenzy to patent genetic fragments beautifully
illustrates the importance of first movers. When NIH sought to patent
gene fragments, other researchers and institutions followed its lead
and stampeded to the patent office.' 97 Decisionmakers, therefore,
must exercise extreme caution before bowing to the demands of these
first movers. Accommodating their propertization requests can create
a chain reaction of similar or related but different property requests
by others.
Furthermore, as the case studies illustrate, courts and legislatures
themselves can trigger a chain reaction when they create new property
rights or expand existing ones. 98 At present, decisionmakers usually
appear unaware that their actions can set off a process with widespread and, as demonstrated below, potentially undesirable implications.1 99 The chain reaction theory cautions decisionmakers to think
carefully before expanding property rights, particularly in borderline
200
cases, and to build in restrictions on these rights more thoughtfully.
At a minimum, decisionmakers should exercise particular care before
how the calls to protect traditional knowledge came later); see also A.O. Adele, The
PoliticalHistory of the TRIPS Agreement: Origins and History of the Negotiations (2001) (on
file with author).
196 E-mail from Dr. Henry Shands, to author (Apr. 12, 2007) (on file with author).
197 See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
198 See supra Part III.A.
199 See infra Part III.C.
200

Id. James Boyle points to a different yet equally troubling spiraling effect that

further supports the need for caution before expanding intellectual property rights.
Boyle notes that "[o] nce a new intellectual property right has been created over some
informational good, the only way to ensure efficient allocation of that good is to give
the rights holder still greater control over the user or consumer in the aftermarket."
James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the PublicDomain, 66
LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 33, 50 (2003). New rights holders, therefore, press for "even

more changes of the rules in their favor" so that they can enforce or maximize their
new rights through, for example, relaxed privacy standards, enforceable shrinkwrap
contracts and changes in antitrust laws. Id.
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expanding property rights in situations where people have identified
potential spillover effects. 20 ' For example, scholars, news services and
academic organizations raised concerns that proposed new intellectual property rights over databases risked dramatically curtailing
access to data itself.20 2 Congress has so far refrained from creating

property rights for databases and thereby has avoided initiating a
chain reaction that would have likely led to the propertization of data.
C. Inefficient and Less Happy Outcomes
Third, the chain reaction thesis anticipates less efficient and
happy outcomes than those suggested by Demsetz's thesis. While the
initial creation of property rights may follow Demsetz's optimistic costbenefit scenario, the second wave of property rights that it triggers
appears to have little to do with any efficient economic calculus.
Rather, it is responsive in nature. Those pressing for these second
generation rights often simply imitate those before them or may seek
to retaliate against the new first generation property norms that they
20 3
object to. They seek new property rights out of a sense of justice.
They fear that unless they receive new property rights, which they can
trade against the first generation rights, they will suffer exclusion from
201 I thank Professor Pamela Samuelson for this point.
202 Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. 3261,
108th Cong. (as introduced in the House, Oct. 8, 2003). Opposition based on the
bill's likely interference with access to data included NetCoalition, a coalition of
Internet service providers and large Internet related companies such as Google,
Yahoo, Bloomberg and CNET, the American Civil Liberties Union and the National
Academy of Engineering. See Grant Gross, Congress Questions DatabaseProtectionProposal, INFOWORLD, Sept. 23, 2003, http://www.infoworld.com/article/03/09/23/HN
databasel.html; Net Coalition Database Protection: A Primer on the Debate in Congress Over Creating a New Property Right in Facts, (Oct. 20, 2003), http://www.
netcoalition.com (search for "database protection"; follow "Backgrounders" hyperlink; then follow "Net Coalition Database Primer" hyperlink). Earlier testimony of
William Wulf, on behalf of the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, the National
Academy of Engineering and the Institute of Medicine, before the House Committee
on Energy and Commerce on September 23, 2003, warned that any database legislation must take care to preserve the public domain status of factual information; and
where uncertainty exists as to whether the effect of potential legislation might extend
exclusive property fights to the factual information itself, Congress should "err on the
side of caution." Database and Collections of Information Misappropriations:Joint Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciay and the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and ConsumerProtection of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 44 (2003) (statement of William Wulf, President,
National Academy of Engineering and Vice Chairman, National Research Council).
203

See supra Part I.
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the marketplace. 20 4 When one takes into account the second generation property rights created in reaction to the first generation rights,
the overall scenario may be less efficient than the property regime
that preceded it. It is, at a minimum, less happy than the scenario
20
anticipated by Demsetz's thesis.

5

Turning first to property rights over biological and genetic material, as discussed earlier, the extension of property rights to man-made
living organisms and their genetic material established by Chakrabarty
and its progeny caused the governments of developing countries that
possessed unimproved biological material to assert property rights
over this material. 20 6 These property regimes are extremely costly to
create, to administer and to enforce. 20 7 They essentially require countries to prevent most, if not all, subcellular genetic sequences of
potential economic value from leaving their country without government authorization. Complying with these regimes also entails substantial expense, 20 8 and the regimes suffer from anticommons
problems. An anticommons can occur when multiple individuals or
entities have rights of exclusion to a given resource. 20 9 Anticommons
problems exist because bioprospectors (those searching for potentially useful genetic material) must now obtain the consent of multiple
property rightsholders, including the national government, local communities and individuals, before removing raw biological samples. 210
204

See supra Part II.C.

205 Id. Others have criticized the modern expansion of intellectual property
rights on efficiency grounds. See, e.g., Boyle, supranote 200, at 49-50; see also Brett M.
Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 257-58 (2007)

(arguing that positive externalities or spillovers can actually encourage innovation
such that more intellectual property rights which effectively limit these spillovers can
cause harm). This Article adds to these criticisms by pointing to the even greater
economic and societal costs that flow from excessive intellectual property rights due
to their setting off a chain reaction of yet additional property rights.
206

See supra Part I.A.

207 Jacoby & Weiss, supra note 168, at 93; Christopher D. Stone, Land Use and
Biodiversity, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 967, 984-85 (2001); see also Safrin, supra note 4, at

649-52 (describing the cumbersome and complex nature of the access-restricting
laws).
208 See generally KERRY TEN KATE & SARAH A. LAIRD, THE COMMERCIAL USE OF
BIODIvERsrIY 32-33 (1999) (noting that access regimes are elaborate and that many

domestic and foreign scientists and companies report finding them cumbersome,
time-consuming and costly to follow).
209 Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transitionfrom
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 622, 677 (1998).

210 Safrin, supranote 4, at 652-58 (describing the anticommons problems created
by developing countries' access-restricting regimes).
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Impressive revenue streams have not offset these high costs. In
fact, rather than generating much revenue for their countries, the
laws that restrict access to genetic material have caused scientists and
corporations to cease or minimize their bioprospecting activity. 21'
For example, after spending one million dollars and two years
attempting to navigate Colombia's access-restricting regime,
BioAndes, a private joint venture between a U.S. pharmaceutical company and a Colombian concern, abandoned its efforts not only in
Colombia but also in the entire Andean Pact region. 2 12 For every
bioprospecting success story, there are dozens of cases where the
projects never got off the ground. 2 13 An extensive study conducted by
Columbia University unearthed few successful bioprospecting cases. 2 14
Meanwhile, companies report that the CBD has caused them to rely
more heavily on ex situ collections rather than brave the source countries' laws and regulations that restrict access to raw genetic material. 21 5 In the aftermath of the CBD, the collection of this material

has slowed to a trickle. 2 16
These regimes have failed to generate much revenue for their
countries and the restrictive climate created by the CBD and these
211

Colin Macilwain,

When Rhetoric Hits Reality in Debate on Bioprospecting, 392

535 (1998); Safrin, supra note 4, at 657-58; David Labrador, Refining Green
Gold, SCi. AM., Dec. 2003, at 38.
212 Envtl. Policy Studies Workshop, supra note 44, at 35-43. Andes Pharmaceuticals, Inc., one of the venture's principal partners, was "founded ... as a direct
response to the CBD with the 'mission to invert the current model for natural products drug discovery' by taking 'state-of-the-art technology to countries rich in biological diversity.'" Id. at 35. In addition, a Colombian national abandoned a
bioprospecting project altogether after realizing the ramifications of the application
process. Id. at 43.
NATURE

213 Safrin, supra note 4, at 657; Christopher Locke, Forest Pharmers:Bioprospecting in
Rain Forests Raises Ethical Questions, RED HERRING, Apr. 1, 2001, at 84, 86; see also

supra note 94, at 109-10 (reporting how there has been little commercial
interest in bioprospecting and noting how most of the projects have been U.S. government subsidized). A fairly comprehensive three-hundred page book by Kerry ten
Kate and Sarah Laird on access and benefit-sharing under the CBD discusses surprisingly few nongovernment examples of bioprospecting projects involving access to
specimens of genetic material for research and then potential application in a
biotechnological good, since the adoption of CBD. See TEN KATE & LAIRD, supra note
208. A large percentage, if not the majority, of the "benefit-sharing" cases discussed
there occurred before the CBD, involved U.S. government subsidies or involved traditional payment for the extraction of bulk raw materials, such as kava, that are used as
inputs for end products rather than genetic sampling. Id. at 104-08.
214 Envtl. Policy Studies Workshop, supra note 44, at 17-67.
215 TEN KATE & LAIRD, supra note 208, at 302.
216 Id. at 301.
BROWN,
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regimes hamper the sharing of genetic material. 217 We see a similar
trend with respect to biological specimens obtained from patients.
While patients used to readily donate these samples, today, prior
informed consent agreements and legal arrangements encumber
2 18
these donations.
Moreover, researchers no longer share genetic and biological
material as freely with each other. 21 9 Concern over the growing
unwillingness by scientists to share tangible research material
prompted the NIH in 1999 to issue guidelines to encourage sharing. 220

The restrictive trend, however, continues. A 2005 study of

genomics researchers found that, while most continued to receive tangible research material from their colleagues, the level of noncompliance with material transfer requests in 2003-2004 increased eighty
percent over noncompliance levels in the late 1990s. 22 1 The study

projected even higher rates of noncompliance in the future. 222 The
22 3
study found that this lack of sharing significantly impeded research.
One in fourteen respondents said that noncompliance by other academics with material transfer requests caused them to abandon at
least one project each year, and one in six respondents reported that
delays in receiving material from other academics caused them to sub2 24
stantially delay their projects.
Patent rights in the genetics area also appear to be spiraling to an
inefficient and unhappy outcome. By mid-2000, the PTO had issued
over 6000 patents on full-length genes isolated from living organisms
and had under consideration over 20,000 gene-related patent applica217 See BROWN, supra note 94, at 138-39 (noting that the expansions of patents in
the area of biotechnology research eventually made it increasingly difficult for
ethnobotanists to collect wild plant specimens); Safrin, supra note 4, at 647-48.
218 See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., GENOMIGS AND WORLD HEALTH 142-45 (2002)
[hereinafter WHO GENOMIcS REPORT 2002], available at http//whqlibdoc.who.int/

hq/2002/a74580.pdf (describing how the patenting of the genetic material of indigenous people is increasing opposition to population genetic studies).
219 See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
220 Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final Notice,
64 Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72,092 (Dec. 23, 1999).
221

John P. Walsh et al., View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 Sci2002, 2002-03 (2005) [hereinafter Walsh et al., View from the Bench]. For the full
study see John P. Walsh et al., Patents, Material Transfers and Access to Research
Inputs in Biomedical Research (Sept. 20, 2005), http://tigger.uic.edu/-jwalsh/Walsh
ChoCohenFina1050922.pdf.
ENCE

222
223
224

Walsh et al., View from the Bench, supra note 221, at 2002-03.
See id.
Id. at 2003.
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tions.225 In a frenzy, researchers and companies rush to patent genes
and parts of genes that they have isolated before someone else
does. 2 26 All of this frenetic genetic patenting activity is, or at a minimum, risks creating an anticommons in genetic material that deters
innovation. 227 As patentees acquire thousands of patents on genetic
sequences for specific genes and fragments of genes, moving forward
with any particular gene therapy requires securing the consent of
these multiple patent holders. 2 28 Obtaining such consent, in turn,
involves high transaction costs to locate and bargain with the holders
of all of these gene patents. 229 Moreover, any one patent holder can
thwart a project entirely by refusing to license its individual genetic
component unless it receives a bribe. 230 For example, estimates indicate that the scientists who created the celebrated "golden rice" (a
strain of rice genetically engineered for enhanced vitamin A) may
have infringed as many as seventy patents. 23 However, the scientists
who created the rice, which might prevent thousands of cases of blindness a year, report that they could not have created the rice had they
attempted to identify and secure the consent of all implicated patent
holders in the process. 23 2 According to the developer of the rice, he
225 Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 7, at 359. "Over a sixth of these patents cover
whole human genes and many of their significant alleles." Id. For an explanation of
when one may patent a gene, see supra note 7.
226 See generally Nicholas Thompson, Gene Blues, WASH. MONTHLY, Apr. 2001, at 9,
10-11 (describing the race to patent genetic sequences).
227 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv.
1575, 1625-26 (2003) (concluding that the biotech industry appears particularly susceptible to anticommons problems); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698,
699-700 (1998) (pointing to anticommons problems in basic medical research); Arti
K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals:Balancing Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 173, 192-94 (pointing to anticommons problems in the biotechnological field); see also Fiona Murray &
Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anticommons Hypothesis 5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 11465, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11465.
This empirical study of the citation rates of scientific papers found a quantitatively
modest but statistically significant anticommons effect in that citations of papers
involving patented technologies declined by nine to seventeen percent after a patent
issues. Id.
228 Burk & Lemley, supra note 227, at 1625-26.
229 See generally id. at 1611 (summarizing the effects of an anticommons).
230 Id. The problem is exacerbated even further by "reach through" licenses,
whereby the owners of upstream patents seek control of and royalties on the downstream uses of their patented genes. Id. at 1626.

231

PETER PRINGLE, FOOD, INC.

232

Id.

33 (2003).
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had to ignore the patents while he was experimenting with the rice
"or I couldn't move at all."'2 33

In addition to anticommons problems, genetic patenting may be
leading to a related problem of patent thickets.

23 4

In contrast to an

anticommons, which requires the aggregation of multiple inputs to
create a single product, patent thickets occur where multiple overlapping patents cover the same technology and can choke an industry.2 35
In a patent thicket environment, holders of patents can prevent each
other from fully utilizing their patent rights as each holder's right
23 6
overlaps with, and hence infringes upon, a right held by another.
Not all agree that the present U.S. system for patenting genetic
material is generally flawed. 237 While some studies suggest an
anticommons problem, 23 8 others question whether a genetic anticommons of any significance exists. 239 For example, a 2005 study by
Walsh, Cho and Cohen failed to find substantial evidence of patents
limiting basic research. Only one percent of a random sample of 398
233
234

Id.
Arti K. Rai, FosteringCumulative Innovation in the BiopharmaceuticalIndustry: The
Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 842 (2001).
235 Burk & Lemley, supra note 227, at 1627 (describing patent thickets).
236 Id.
237 Richard A. Epstein, Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material, at 22-26
(March 2003), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/epstein/resources/rae.genome.new.pdf (arguing that the current system basically functions well and that the
U.S. should "steady the course," and rejecting "middle of the road" proposals
described above in favor of an "all or nothing" approach where some genetic substances, like EST fragments, would be left in the public domain, but everything else
would be governed by the usual rules of patent protection); see also Erik S. Maurer,
Comment, An EconomicJustificationfor a Broad Interpretationof Patentable Subject Matter,
95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1057, 1090 (2001) (favoring a broad interpretation of patentable
subject matter).
238 See supra note 227.
239 Charles R. McManis & Sucheol Noh, The Impact of the Bayh-Dole Act on
Genetic Research and Development: Evaluating the Arguments and Empirical Evidence to Date 48 (Aug. 13, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (summarizing recently
released studies concerning the impact of Bayh-Dole on genetic research and concluding that anticommons concerns have been overstated), available at http://www.
law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers2/mcmanis.doc.
Earlier articles challenging an anticommons effect include John J. Doll, The Patenting of DNA, 280 SciENCE 689, 689 (1998) (arguing that "new areas of technology do not create the need
for a whole new specialized patent law"); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenburg, 66 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 298 n.47 (2003) (discussing patent thickets but stating that
companies' responses have been to put things into the public domain); and John P.
Walsh et al., Work Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021, 1021 (2003) (concluding that strong patent protection in the area of research tools has little thwarted
innovation).
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biomedical academics reported project delays of over a month due to
patents and patents had not caused any to completely abandon a line
of research. 240 However, a report by the National Research Council
expresses concern about the future. 24 1 It concludes that the lack of
substantial evidence for an anticommons or patent thicket problem
among biomedical researchers may simply be due to a lack of awareness among investigators about relevant patent rights, and this is
changing. 2 42 Indeed, the Walsh study revealed that when scientists
believed that their research implicated another's patent, some thirty
percent either changed their research approach or substantially
delayed their work.2 43 Overall, most scholars believe that the patent

system in the
2 44
innovation.

genetics

area

has

overreached

240 Walsh et al., View from the Bench, supra note 221, at 2002.
241 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC

and

RESEARCH

inhibits

AND PROTEOMIC

134 (2005).

242 Id. at 135-36.
243 Walsh et al., View from the Bench, supra note 221, at 2002. At present, researchers may be gambling that patent holders will not sue them. This could rapidly change
if a high-profile Napster-like case was brought against researchers and their
institutions.
244 See Andrew Chin, Research in the Shadow of DNA Patents, 87J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC'Y 846, 904-05 (2005) (demonstrating how even a small number of
oligonucleotide patents would impair two of the most promising procedures for the
discovery of other oligonucleotides and DNA molecules and concluding that the patenting of DNA molecules actually retards the "identification and sequencing of so
many other useful DNA molecules" that DNA patents do not promote the discovery
and disclosure of DNA molecules in aggregate); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 227,
at 701 ("An anticommons in biomedical research may be more likely to endure than
in other areas of intellectual property because of the high transaction costs of bargaining, heterogeneous interests among owners, and cognitive biases of researchers."); Rai, supra note 227, at 192-94 ("An important impediment to accelerated
preclinical and clinical investigation might be created by the hundreds of thousands
of patent applications that have been filed by certain firms on early-stage genomics
research .

..

."); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Varying the Course in PatentingGenetic Mate-

rial: A Counter-Proposalto Richard Epstein's Steady Course 1 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 59, 2003), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstractid=394000 (disagreeing with Epstein, noting that "the literature
questioning aspects of genomic patenting and proposing all sorts of interventions" to
limit the innovation inhibiting aspects of this patenting activity, like compulsory
licensing, experimental use defenses and condemnation proceedings, is growing
"large" and "fast"); see also Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 7, at 462 (suggesting the
current interpretation of the Patent Act leads to "blocking and conflicting patentable
subject matter" which leads to "tollbooth charges, nonresearch development costs,
and delays" in the area of biotechnology); Philippe Jacobs & Geertrui Van Overwalle,
Gene Patents: A Different Approach, 23 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 505, 505-06 (2001)
(arguing that patents should not be granted for DNA but only for downstream medi-
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The overprivatization of genetic material has a high cost. The
anticommons and other problems engendered by both the sovereignbased and the patent-based ownership systems lead to the underutilization of potentially helpful genetic material. As a result, society
incurs the opportunity cost of not enjoying potentially helpful drugs,
therapeutics and other bioengineered goods. In addition, the extensive assertion of property rights over genetic material means that soci245
ety forgoes the benefits of more open systems.
In the case of genetic material, the open system that predated
extensive sovereign and private rights over genetic material had
numerous advantages. The widespread sharing of biological material
that occurred under the open system increased rather than decreased
the global genetic pool because it ensured the maintenance of genetic
material in multiple locations.2 46 It resulted, for example, in the widespread distribution and preservation of crops and crop varieties away
cal goods). Others, while accepting the patent eligibility of isolated naturally occurring genes, have proffered a series of mechanisms, such as a research fair use
exception or compulsory licensing, to diminish the reach and the innovation-inhibiting effects of these gene patents. See, e.g., Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts
Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the European Union: An
Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1623,
1678-90 (2001); Holman & Munzer, supra note 128, at 813-25 (proposing an ASCAP
system for genes, whereby all would have access to registered, isolated and identified
genes upon payment of a fixed fee); Janice M. Mueller, No "DilettanteAffair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76
WASH. L. REV. 1, 58-66 (2001) (suggesting a broad compulsory licensing system).
245 See generally KEMAL BAsLAR, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 40-41 (1998) (describing the Romans' belief that sharing
certain basic resources would further the common interest); BOYLE, supranote 110, at
9-10, 119, 125 (arguing for an expansion of the public domain, pointing to the "erroneous belief that the greater the level of intellectual protection, the greater the progress" and arguing that intellectual property regimes "can actually slow down scientific
progress, diminish the opportunities for creativity, and curtailthe availability of new
products"); Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 959-60 (2005) (identifying classes of resources
that generate positive externalities for society if maintained as open access or commons goods); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 768-70, 775-81 (1986) (generally setting forth
the benefits of open access goods which enable a society to become wealthier by maintaining certain things, such as roads, as openly accessible).
246 Stephen B. Brush, Genetically Modified Organisms in Peasant Farming: Social
Impact and Equity, 9 IND.J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 135, 157 (2001) ("Genetic resources
retain their viability partly because they are shared so widely."). Some resources benefit from being shared, creating a more the merrier effect. Carol M. Rose, The Several
Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN.
L. REV. 129, 150-52 (1998). Genetic resources constitute this kind of resource.
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from their places of origin. 24 7 This benefited all. For example, under
the open system, grapevine varieties from France were brought to the
United States.2 48 Later blight destroyed much of France's vineyards. 249 The United States sent grape root stocks back to France to
rejuvenate France's ravished vineyards. 25' The American wine industry bases itself in part on vines from France. 25' The French wine
industry in turn bases itself in part on repatriated grape root stocks
from the United States. 25 2 The open system also facilitated the
improvement of genetic material.2 53 For example, breeders created
the semi-dwarf varieties of wheat and rice that formed the bedrock of
the Green Revolution from raw genetic material freely obtained from
Japan. 25 4 In turn, these improved semi-dwarf varieties were rapidly

shared throughout the world. 2 55 The open system also "produced ex
situ international and national structures to conserve, share, and
improve biological and genetic material" as well as facilitated interna2 56
tional collaboration between scientists.
The patent paradox and overall patent activity in the United
States seem to indicate that the U.S. patent system has settled on a
suboptimal level of property rights. Between 1983 and 2002, the number of patents issued in the United States roughly tripled, growing
from 62,000 to 177,000 per year. 25 7 Patent applications also rose dra-

matically with the PTO receiving a staggering 350,000 applications per
year by 2004.258 This would constitute good news if it signaled that we
247
248

Brush, supra note 246, at 157.
See generally GEORGE ORDISH, THE GREAT WINE BLIGHT 103-19 (Sidwich &Jack-

son Ltd. 1987) (1972) (explaining the history of American and French experimentation with each other's grape roots and vinyards).
249 Id. at 15.
250 Id. at 103.
251 Id. at 19-32.
252 Id. at 103-19.
253 Id. at 116-19.
254 PRINGLE, supra note 231, at 42.

255

Brush, supra note 246, at 143.

256 Safrin, supra note 4, at 671. The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) represents an excellent example of the collection, sharing

and improvement of genetic resources that flourished under the open system. The
CGIAR system consists of sixteen international research centers that hold and
improve seed and other plant material collected from around the world. Geoffrey
Hawtin & Timothy Reeves, IntellectualPropertyRights and Access to Genetic Resources in the
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS III: GLOBAL GENETIC RESOURCES: ACCESS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 41, 41-42,

53-55 (Steve A. Eberhart et al. eds., 1998).
257 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 11, at 11 (representing a 5.7% increase per year).
258 Id.
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had become a nation of Thomas Edisons. Yet, international comparisons show that U.S. inventions with confirmed worldwide significance
grew "at a rate less than half that of domestic U.S. patent" grants in
the 1990s. 259 The United States appears to be awash in patents of

questionable merit and of little value. 2 60 IBM, for example, estimated
that only forty of 10,000 patents that it had evaluated had any individual value. 26 1 Courts deem invalid almost half of the patents that they
review.2 62 As described above, most patent holders never recoup the
costs of patent prosecution and perceive their patents to hold so little
value that they let them lapse rather than pay the periodic mainte2 63
nance fees.

This extensive patent activity comes at a high price. People cur-

264
rently spend approximately $4.3 billion annually to obtain patents
and several billion more to enforce them. 265 A 2001 survey conducted

by the American Intellectual Property Law Association estimated the
direct litigation costs of a patent infringement lawsuit, where $1 million to $25 million dollars was at stake, at $2 million per side. 266 For

cases with less than $1 million at risk, costs to each side ran $300,000
to $750,000, often almost equaling the amount at stake.2 6 7 One study
anticipated that in 1991 U.S. companies would have spent over $1 billion enforcing and defending patent lawsuits, "a substantial amount
relative to the $3.7 billion" that they spent on basic research that
year.

268

In addition to these direct monetary costs, intellectual property
scholars have identified other costs to overbroad intellectual property
rights, including that they distort markets away from a competitive
norm, interfere with the ability of other creators to work and can
259
260

Id. at 143.

Id. at 12, 142-44.

261

SeeJames E. White, The US. First-to-Invent System, the Mossinghoff Conclusion,

and Statistics, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 357, 362 (2003).
262 Lemley, supra note 122, at 1500 (finding that courts hold invalid forty-six percent of the patents in cases where they issue a final judgment on validity).
263 See supra note 123 and accompanying text. As many as two-thirds of all patent
owners allow their patents to expire rather than pay the maintenance fees. John R.
Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 442 (2004).

264 Allison et al., supra note 263, at 435.
265 Lemley, supra note 122, at 1499-1502.
266 AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW AsS'N, REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY 22 (2003).
267 Id.
268 Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463, 470
(1995).
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induce overinvestment in research and development. 2 69 Extensive
patent rights improperly granted to trivial innovations can also
impede scientific collaboration and can deter researchers from pursuing a field. 2 70 These intangible costs are exacerbated by the drag that

extensive patent rights place on international scientific collaboration
and international comity. Jaffe and Lerner conclude that the intangible costs. of the present U.S. system with its high level of low quality
patents greatly exceed even litigation costs.

27 1

Property scholars note that property rights are sticky.2 72 Once
societies create them, they find them difficult to dislodge, and ineffi2 73
cient and imprudent property regimes do not readily self-correct.
Property rights over genetic material exhibit this stickiness. For example, rather than curtailing their control over raw genetic material in
light of the dearth of bioprospecting activity, sovereigns have tightened their grip over genetic material even further by refusing to grant
a patent unless the applicant has complied with their access-restricting
regimes. 274 Although some contrary examples exist, 275 the expansion

269 For a summary of these arguments advanced by David Friedman, Brett
Frischmann and others, see Lemley, supra note 30, at 1058-64 & nn.112-34. For a
discussion of the costs of expansive intellectual property rights in cyberspace, see
Ruth L. Okediji, Trading Posts in Cyberspace: Information Markets and the Construction of
ProprietaryRights, 44 B.C. L. REv. 545, 545 (2003) (arguing that "expansive construction of intellectual property rights distorts the informational properties of such rights
and reintroduces high search and use costs to transactions in cyberspace").
270 Arti K. Rai, EngagingFacts and Policy: A Multi-InstitutionalApproach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1035, 1072-73 (2003).
271 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 11, at 174-75. Jaffe and Lerner, as well as Rai,
supranote 270, disagree with Lemley. Lemley defends the PTO's poor quality of patent examination as rational from an economic perspective because these patents will
never be litigated and are unlikely to be licensed. Lemley, supranote 122, at 1503-08.
They therefore do not warrant extensive energy at the examination stage. Id.
272 See, e.g., Carolyn J. Frantz, Should the Rules of MaritalProperty Be Normative, 2004
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 265, 270; Merrill, supranote 9, at S337; see also Carrier, supranote 11,
at 5 (finding the increased propertization of knowledge "irreversible").
273 Frantz, supra note 272, at 270.
274 See Safrin, supra note 4, at 665-67.
275 IBM, for example, recently dedicated hundreds of patented technologies to
the public domain. See Press Release, IBM, IBM Helps Drive Open Source Development (Feb. 25, 2005), available at http://www-03.ibm.com/industries/education/
doc/content/news/pressrelease/ 125853111 0.html. The free software and open
source software movements also demonstrate a movement in certain situations to
either preserve or expand the public domain. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, How
Copyleft Uses License Rights to Succeed in the Open Source Software Revolution and the Implications for Article 2B, 36 Hous. L. REv. 179, 182-85 (1999).
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of intellectual property rights that has occurred in the last two
27 6
decades largely exhibits similar tenacity.

While the press to grant intellectual property rights to traditional
knowledge is new, it too is unlikely to produce an efficient regime.
First, while initial demands to protect traditional knowledge stem
from sympathetic groups, such as indigenous communities and developing states, any movement to create new property rights to protect
traditional knowledge will not likely remain limited to knowledge
from these communities or countries. The chain reaction thesis
predicts that others, including those from Western societies, will
demand that their Western traditional knowledge receive protection
as well. Each year when I teach about international developments
seeking to establish sui generis property regimes to cover traditional
knowledge, some students invariably assert that traditional Western
knowledge should receive the same protection. 2 77 For example, one
student recently elaborated on all the property rights that would
attach to the hamburger. 2 78 The developed country of Portugal has
already enacted laws to protect traditional knowledge. 279 Should the
movement to extend intellectual property rights to traditional knowledge take root, we will likely see demands to accord intellectual property protection not only to the knowledge of shamans but also to the
Irish jig and to Greek mythology.
Second, the propertization of traditional knowledge may enable
corporate moguls to own it. Once folklore is commodified, it can be
sold to the highest bidder. Disney Corporation might purchase exclu276 Carrier, supra note 11, at 5.
277 See, e.g., Michael Pesochinsky, Do We Have to Pay for the Indigenous Knowledge 18 (2005) (unpublished student paper, on file with author) (noting that most
innovations are never patented and asserting that if intellectual property rights are
extended to cover the traditional knowledge of developing countries then "the West
may justly request" the payment of royalties whenever "the traditional knowledge of
Western people . . .is put to use by developing countries").
278 The student analyzed the issue as follows:
Suppose you buy a Big Mac Meal at McDonalds.... You would have to pay
royalties to American Indians for the potato in fries and tomato in ketchup;
also, do not forget the Hungarians who invented ketchup. Then you should
pay India for cucumbers and Israel for pickling them. African countries can
justly request royalties for deep frying french fries, and Iraq should be paid
for wheat in buns. It would be very difficult to determine which country
should get credit for beef, but Germany must be compensated for the whole
idea of hamburger.
Id. at 18-19.
279 Portugal, Decree-Law No. 118/2002, art. 3(6) (April 20, 2002) (providing for
the registration and the protection of traditional knowledge for a fifty year renewable
term).
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sive rights to Andean or German folklore. Merck might buy the folk
remedies of India.
Finally, the overall cost to society of propertizing large swaths of
traditional knowledge would be vast. "A culture could not exist,"
notes Wendy Gordon, if it prohibited all free riding. 280 "Every person's education involves a form of free riding on his predecessors'
28 1
efforts, as does every form of scholarship and scientific progress."
According property status to all value would lead to "the ultimate dis28 2
ruption of community-paralysis."
CONCLUSION

We live in a time of increased propertization. Classic theories for
the evolution of property rights consider the emergence of private
property to be a progressive development reflecting a society's movement to a more efficient property regime. As I have demonstrated in
this Article, however, a more subtle and damaging chain reaction
dynamic may characterize the emergence of property rights, a
dynamic that traditional theories for intellectual and other property
rights neither anticipate nor explain.
The chain reaction theory for the evolution of property rights has
explanatory power. It anticipates and explains the emergence of second generation property rights, a phenomenon that has received little
attention in the legal literature. It also contributes to unraveling the
longstanding mystery of how property regimes evolve. In particular,
societies sometimes move toward more exclusive property regimes
through a process of demands for property rights that build upon
each other and that have little to do with any efficiency calculation.
The present propertization trend stems, in part, from the chain reaction dynamic.
The chain reaction theory also has cautionaray implications. It
predicts that the more property rights a society recognizes the more
property rights it will have in the future. Consequently, policy makers
must exercise extreme caution before bowing to the demands of those
who initially seek new or expanded property rights. Granting these
rights will likely unleash a chain reaction of demands for, and result in
the creation of, additional, unanticipated and potentially undesirable
property regimes.

280
281
282

Gordon, supra note 11, at 167.
Id.
Id. at 179 n.113.
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